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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, it has become clear that the TRIPS regime is 
in trouble.1 Although lawmaking in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has essentially stalled,2 there is a 
continuing need to recalibrate the rules applicable to knowledge 
production. For developing countries, entry into the WTO was a 
compromise. When intellectual property lawmaking was centered 
in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), these 
nations resisted attempts to increase the level of protection. That 
changed, however, with the inclusion of intellectual property in 
negotiations over trade; in return for access to markets in the 
developed world, developing countries were required to enact and 
enforce new intellectual property laws.3 While the TRIPS 
Agreement tried to ease their conversion to greater protection, 
the transitional provisions it included proved to be largely 
illusory: the time periods for compliance were too short; the 
promises of technology transfer and technical assistance, 
inadequately realized.4 Furthermore, the Agreement paid little 
attention to the problem of providing access to the training and 
educational materials that would allow these countries to 
advance to the intellectual frontier.5 Paradoxically, for some 
                                                          
 1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 2. Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1. 
 3. See generally CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY (2006). 
 4. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 6667 (providing a ten-year grace period for 
least-developed country members and requiring developed countries to provide incentives 
to promote technology transfer and technical cooperation); see also Duncan Matthews & 
Viviana Munoz-Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United States, 
Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. 629, 63233, 64950 (2006) (suggesting that the deficiencies in the design and 
delivery of IP-related technical assistance to developing countries may result from built-
in limitations to Article 67 of TRIPS).  
 5. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
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developing countries, the WTO regime can also be insufficiently 
protective: TRIPS rights are structured for the types of 
knowledge goods generated in the North, but do not cover the 
traditional knowledge, folklore, and natural endowments that 
constitute much of the informational wealth of the South. To be 
sure, the Doha Declaration and subsequent actions dealt with a 
few of the concerns of developing countries,6 but unless more 
radical accommodations are found, many WTO members may 
languish in a social and economic backwater, paying high prices 
for information products without the ability to fully exploit their 
own creative capacities.7 
In developed nations, the problems are not very different, for 
there as well TRIPS now offers both too much and too little 
protection. The Agreement was, after all, crafted for a particular 
eraan era that largely predated Internet commerce in 
trademarked goods, distribution of digitized copyrighted 
materials, and the informatics revolution within the patent 
industries.8 The explosion in global marketing puts pressure on 
the territoriality principle embedded in TRIPS,9 arguably leading 
to underprotection, particularly of works distributed 
electronically. At the same time, however, the emergence of new 
intellectual opportunities and enterprises alters the economics of 
information production. The TRIPS Agreements strong 
commitment to a particular vision of proprietary rightsand, on 
the patents side, to technological neutralitymakes it difficult to 
revise the law to deal with such matters as the thickets of rights 
created in the software and biotechnological sectors, open source 
innovation, and new opportunities for serial and collaborative 
production.10 
                                                          
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 288586 (2006) (Basic needs [including food, education, and 
health care] have been underemphasized in much of the debate about what to do about 
intellectual property globalization.); J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: 
Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 11, 87 
(1997) (stressing the need for accelerated development of technical knowledge within 
underdeveloped countries). 
 6. See, e.g., Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: Adequate Remuneration for 
Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INTL ECON. L. 927, 935 (2008) (discussing efforts in 
the Doha Round to improve access to patented pharmaceuticals in developing countries). 
 7. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic Innovation, Development and 
Trade: Intellectual Property as a Case Study in Global Administrative Law (Inst. for Intl 
Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2008/4, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1316925. 
 8. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the 
Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 86364, 871, 88990 (2009). 
 9. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law 
from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 95566 (2004). 
 10. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual 
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In theory, the problems facing WTO members could be 
resolved through new lawmaking. This could take a number of 
forms. For instance, a bottom up approach would give states 
greater flexibility to adapt local laws to deal with the different 
problems they each encounter. As Jerry Reichman suggests in 
his contribution to this volume, emerging nations, new to both 
intellectual property and to innovation, are particularly fertile 
grounds for such legal experimentation.11 When such adaptations 
are picked up by other WTO members, the Agreement could be 
modified to reflect new consensuses. Alternatively, solutions 
could originate at the international level; after codification into 
the Agreement, they would then trickle down as member states 
transposed their new obligations into domestic law.12 For a 
variety of reasons, however, neither of these approaches has 
materialized. In part, the problem is simply stasis in the WTO. 
In part, there is a disconnect between the WTOs objective of 
enhancing economic welfare through free trade and the values 
embodied in intellectual property law.13 For example, because of 
concerns over how liberalizing the rules on compulsory licensing 
would affect the market, even the one concrete achievement of 
the Doha Roundassuring developing countries access to 
essential medicineshas yet to be fully implemented.14 
As many have noted, the WTOs adjudicatory system has 
compensated somewhat for the lack of activity in the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council.15 But for a number of 
                                                          
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INTL ECON. L. 431, 43336 (2004) 
(exploring methods for implementing subject-matter exclusions in patent law while still 
complying with the technological neutrality requirements of Article 27 of TRIPS). 
 11. Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the 
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115 (2009); accord Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in 
Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking 
1213 (Inst. for Intl Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2009/5, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1442785.  
 12. Of course, this lawmaking approach can generate its own problems if it seeks to 
impose a one-size-fits-all model of intellectual property protection. See Dinwoodie & 
Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 43536. 
 13. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, 
Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 61, 7679 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and 
Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INTL L. 275, 27781 (1997). 
 14. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 54, 39597 (3d ed. 2008) (summarizing the amendment creating a tailored 
mechanism for compulsory licenses to enhance access to patented pharmaceuticals); 
Taubman, supra note 6, at  92935 (same).  
 15. See, e.g., TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL 
BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 21415 (2004) (noting the DSB is dealing with 
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reasons, it is not a substitute for a well-functioning legislative 
body. It cannot replicate the top-down approach of an 
international agreement on substantive norms because, under 
the Understanding for Dispute Settlement (DSU),16 the decisions 
by the Dispute Resolution Board (DSB) may not diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.17 And 
the institutional character of the DSB does not encourage 
disregard of this formal limit on judicial activism.18 These 
constraints, both formal and institutional, appear to allow the 
DSB to complement a bottom-up approach because the TRIPS 
Agreement ostensibly leaves members with substantial room to 
maneuver.19 Members can, for example, increase the level of 
domestic protection.20 But as we have explained in other writings, 
the DSB has interpreted TRIPS flexibilities so narrowly that 
member states cannot otherwise adapt their laws to new 
circumstances.21 
                                                          
open questions on which of the other organs of the WTO are failing to act); Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the 
Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and 
Implementing Rules on International Trade?, 8 J. INTL ECON. L. 51, 6871 (2005) 
(suggesting reasons why WTO members tend to relegate important decisionmaking to 
judicial bodies when legislative action would be more appropriate). 
 16. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
 17. DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.2. The TRIPS Councils role in lawmaking is 
similarly circumscribed. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations art. IX, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
 18. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts 
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 50318 (2000) (rejecting an activist 
interpretive philosophy in resolving WTO disputes). Whether this constraint holds in the 
long term might depend in part on whether a sufficient number of intellectual property 
disputes reach the Appellate Body, whose legally binding reports more closely resemble 
judicial decisions than the reports of dispute settlement panels (whose reports have a 
more political or diplomatic resonance). See Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? 
WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power, in 
THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 11, 11 (Thomas Cottier & 
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003). 
 19. Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 23, 65 (Carlos M. Correa 
& Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008) (characterizing the TRIPS enforcement 
provisions as favouring broad legal standards over narrow rules, the ambiguity of 
which allows dispute settlement evaluators to take account of local circumstances and 
differing legal philosophies). 
 20. New Zealand, for example, offers enhanced protection for the Maori culture. See 
Graeme W. Austin, Valuing Domestic Self-Determination in International Intellectual 
Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 119899 (2002) (explaining how the 
New Zealand Parliament responded to intellectual property concerns of the Maori tribe by 
drafting a trademark bill precluding registration of certain Maori words and symbols). 
 21. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 435; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
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There are other confounding factors. Countries are showing 
signs of giving up on the WTO. Some have begun to use bilateral 
agreements to enhance the level of protection.22 Others are 
engaging in forum shopping at the multilateral level (regime 
shifting).23 Claims to the knowledge embedded in natural 
resources are moving to negotiations over the Convention on 
Biological Diversity;24 some intellectual property issues have been 
restructured as human rights claims;25 and a new criminal 
enforcement regime is under contemplation.26 As Peter Yu 
suggests in his contribution to this volume, what is emerging is 
an international IP regime complex, consisting of institutions 
such as the World Health Organization; the Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity; the Food and Agriculture 
Organization; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).27 In part, 
the focus has even shifted back, from the WTO to WIPO. 
Although, in theory, regulatory competition could enrich 
international innovation policy, the early indication is that 
asymmetries in bargaining power, coupled with the overlap in 
lawmaking authority, are leading to a suboptimal global regime: 
thickets of rights,28 conflicting demands,29 disputes that 
                                                          
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 95, 97100 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Dynamics]; 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: 
Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 445, 44849 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying]. 
 22. Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Property Enforcement: A Reality Gap 
(Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 47, 6168 (2008). 
 23. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics 
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INTL L. 1, 5561 (2004). 
 24. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 15(1), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
 25. Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 1213 (2008). 
 26. See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Request for Public 
Comments, 73 Fed. Reg. 8910 (Feb. 15, 2008) (requesting public comments regarding a 
proposed treaty to address international counterfeiting and piracy concerns); Trainer, 
supra note 22, at 75 (describing a report from the office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
recommending stronger and more effective criminal and border enforcement to combat 
international counterfeiting and piracy). 
 27. Peter Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. 
REV. 979 (2009).  
 28. Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The 
International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 AM. J. INTL L. 641, 653
55 (2004) (discussing biotechnological inventions). 
 29. See, e.g., Panel Report, European CommunitiesProtection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 
15, 2005) [hereinafter EC-GI] (resolving a dispute regarding conflicts between geographic 
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perpetually cycle,30 and uncertainties created by institutional 
cacophony.31 
However, the move to WIPO is intriguing, for it suggests an 
institutional design that could make the international 
intellectual property system more responsive to changing needs. 
WIPO and its predecessor, the United International Bureaux for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), were established 
to consolidate the international intellectual property regime and 
WIPO agreed that, as part of its mission, it would consider the 
impact of intellectual property protection on the developing 
world.32 Although WIPOs early attempts at resolving the 
problems of the South largely faltered, it recently renewed its 
commitment to a Development Agenda and has even taken up 
questions about overprotection in the North.33 WIPO has a 
governance structure that potentially permits more diverse input 
than the WTO and greater flexibility in voting. It has 
restructured its norm development processes to enable it to 
respond expeditiously to new issues through the adoption of soft 
                                                          
indications and trademarks); Mitchell Smith, The Relationship Between TRIPs and the 
CBD: A Way Forward? 36 (May 11, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Houston 
Law Review) (discussing conflicts between TRIPS and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity). 
 30. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar N.P., [1984] FSR 413 (CA) 
(U.K.) (one national component of a multi-territorial dispute between Anheuser-Busch, an 
American brewer, and a Czech brewery dating back to the early 1900s); Anheuser-Busch 
Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 (Grand Chamber 2007) (ECHR), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search 73049/01 under 
application number) (addressing same long-running dispute in terms of Portugals 
compliance with human rights law); Joined Cases T-225/06, T-255/06, T-257/06 & T-
309/06, Budejovický Budvar v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks & Designs) (OHIM) (Ct. First Instance 2008) (EC), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/home (search T-225/06 under case name) 
(overturning OHIMs decision to grant Anheuser-Busch EU-wide rights to use the word 
BUD for beer and other alcoholic beverages); see also Case T-191/07, Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc. v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (OHIM) 
(Ct. First Instance 2009) (EC), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/home 
(search T-191/07 under case number) (refusing to grant Community Trademark in the 
term BUDWEISER to Anheuser-Busch). 
 31. See Decision by the Arbitrators, European CommunitiesRegime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 152, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 
2000) [hereinafter Ecuador-Bananas] (suggesting that it was not within the jurisdiction of 
WTO arbitrators to assess whether measures authorized under the WTO agreements 
might result in noncompliance with obligations under WIPO conventions). 
 32. See Debora J. Halbert, The World Intellectual Property Organization: Past, 
Present and Future, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 253, 255, 26266 (2007). 
 33. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Report of the Provisional Committee on 
Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda (PCDA), Fourth Session, WIPO Doc. 
PCDA/4/3 (Aug. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_4/ 
pcda_4_3_prov_2.pdf. An excellent overview of this renewed commitment is provided by 
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009). 
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law instruments.34 As a result, it is also not suffering as badly 
from the lawmaking problems confounding the WTO. Post-
TRIPS, it has held conferences and issued influential reports on 
emerging issues;35 it has also successfully concluded negotiations 
over several new intellectual property instruments.36 
Significantly, the TRIPS Agreement contemplates a formal tie 
with WIPO. The two organizations have entered into an 
agreement to establish a mutually supportive relationship37 and 
enjoy a host of informal connections.38 In theory, then, WIPO 
could serve as a vehicle for keeping WTO law abreast of the 
evolving demands of both producers and consumers of 
innovation, as well as the varied needs of the WTOs 
membership. With WIPOs greater receptivity to emerging issues 
and the WTOs capacity to enforce compliance, some of the 
impasses caused by regime shifting would hopefully abate, along 
with the other problems associated with overlapping regulatory 
authority. 
Greater input from WIPO would be beneficial for another 
reason as well. Because the focus of the WTO is trade, the TRIPS 
Agreement tends to view intellectual property very much as a 
commodity. Lost in the drafting process was the sense that 
intellectual property embodies cultural values, that it 
                                                          
 34. See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 8084 (describing how WIPO has successfully 
employed mechanisms to produce soft law instruments such as the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) that may in practice turn out to be harder law). 
 35. See, e.g., WIPO, Use of Trademarks on the Internet: Issues Paper, WIPO Doc. 
SCT/3/4 (Oct. 7, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_3/ 
sct_3_4.pdf; WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc. 833(E) (Sept. 20, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
export/sites/www/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf; WIPO, Final Report of 
the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process (Apr. 30, 1999), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf. 
 36. See, e.g., Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, opened for signature Mar. 
28, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-2 (2007); WIPO Copyright Treaty, opened for signature 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17 (1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT), opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17 (1997); 
Trademark Law Treaty and Regulations, opened for signature Oct. 27, 1994, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 105-35 (1998); Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Industrial Designs, July 2, 1999, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/hague/en/legal_texts/pdf/geneva_act_1999.pdf. 
 37. Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the 
World Trade Organization, Preamble, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996) [hereinafter 
WTO/WIPO Agreement]; see also TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 63, 68 (addressing 
cooperation with WIPO in implementing TRIPS). 
 38. Indeed, the panels of the DSB that have produced reports on intellectual 
property disputes have included former high-ranking officials of WIPO, such as Mihály 
Ficsor, who served on the panel that resolved a patent dispute involving Canada. See 
Panel Report, CanadaPatent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 
17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceuticals]. 
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encompasses the building blocks of education and future 
technological development, or that it protects goods essential to 
social welfare.39 Although WIPOs stated mission is to promote 
the protection of intellectual property throughout the world40 
and its contributions to the WTO have tended to reflect that pro-
protection ethos,41 its institutional structurewhich requires 
member states to enter into intellectual property agreements 
without the possibility of side payments in the form of 
concessions on unrelated mattershas always forced it to strike 
a balance between access and proprietary interests.42 
Furthermore, in most intellectual property areas, its standards 
lend themselves to greater flexibility than do the more 
comprehensive requirements of TRIPS. Indeed, WIPO has begun 
a process of examining just how flexible these instruments are.43 
In short, the organization, along with the agreements it 
administers, brings to the table an intellectual property 
sensibility that is currently lacking in the WTO. 
Unfortunately, however, the nature of the lawmaking 
relationship between these two organizations has yet to be fully 
elucidated. There are other agreements within the WTO 
framework that rely explicitly on the expertise of non-WTO 
organizations: they reference standards enunciated by 
international bodies with relevant expertise,44 mandate 
                                                          
 39. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in 
WTO Law 1012, 4546 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law, 
Research Paper Series No. 08-02,  2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 
1309526.  
 40. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization arts. 3
4, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added).  
 41. For example, Mihály Ficsor, the WIPO official who served on a DSB panel, see 
supra note 38, is a consultant to the International Intellectual Property Alliance, a trade 
association of copyright holders. Mihály FicsorBiography, http://www.iipa.com/html/ 
Bio_Mihaly_Ficsor.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2009). 
 42. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INTL 
L. 369, 409 (1997) (discussing how this balance found its way into the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty). 
 43. For example, WIPO committees are engaged in an effort to catalog national 
approaches to limitations and exceptions. See WIPO, WIPO Study on Limitations and 
Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, WIPO Doc. 
SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/ 
en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf; WIPO, Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions 
and Limitations to the Rights, SCP/13/3 (Feb. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf. 
 44. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 348
50 (2003). Pauwelyn cites (1) the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, which refers to 
standards established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of 
Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention; (2) the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
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consultations with groups having overlapping jurisdiction,45 or 
establish joint oversight in areas where there are potential 
conflicts.46 In contrast, the WTOs relationship with WIPO is 
opaque.47 TRIPS incorporates provisions of two WIPO 
instruments (the Paris and Berne Conventions),48 and references 
others.49 Still, it is not evident whether (or how) the WTO should 
be taking account of WIPOs view of these commitments.50 Nor is 
it clear how (or when) new developments within these 
conventions should affect WTO obligations.51 The Agreement 
permits the TRIPS Council to consult with and seek information 
from any source it deems appropriate to carry out its 
obligations,52 but at best WIPO enjoys observer status at 
meetings.53 Furthermore, the current WTO/WIPO Agreement is 
                                                          
14, which refers implicitly to actions undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD); and (3) the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade arts. 2.4.5, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, which makes general references to 
standards developed by international organizations. Id.  
 45. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XV, para. 2, Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (providing for consultations with 
the International Monetary Fund); PAUWELYN, supra note 44, at 347 (describing the 
interrelationship between certain WTO and IMF rules). 
 46. See PAUWELYN, supra note 44, at 350 (discussing the Ministerial Decision on 
Trade and Environment, Apr. 14, 1994, Annex 2, MTN.TNC/45(MIN), 33 I.L.M. 1267 
(1994), which is part of the 1994 Final Act and establishes a committee that explores 
potential conflicts between the WTO treaty and other multilateral environmental 
agreements). 
 47. This might not be surprising. On the eve of the conclusion of TRIPS, scholars 
and policymakers seriously debated whether the new international intellectual property 
system would develop in the WTO or WIPO. See Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang, Report on 
the Second Ringberg-Symposium, in GATT OR WIPO?: NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 3040 (Friedrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard 
Schricker eds., 1989). The relationship could have been defined quite hierarchically. See 
Ruth L. Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual Property 
Norms, 39 NETH. Y.B. INTL L. 69, 10004 (2008). And some of the early activity at WIPO 
after TRIPS might be explained as a quest to prove relevance and thus secure a 
prominent place in such a hierarchy. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the 
International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1004−05 (2002). 
 48. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 2.1, 9.1. 
 49. Id. art. 2.2 (referring to the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits). 
 50. See, e.g., W.R. Cornish, Genevan Bootstraps, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 336, 336
38 (1997) (discussing the relationship between the Model Provisions on Protection Against 
Unfair Competition, published by WIPO, and interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 51. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INTL L. 441, 451−55 (1997). 
 52. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 68. Earlier drafts of the Agreement contemplated a 
larger role for intellectual property experts. See GERVAIS, supra note 14, at 530−31 
(noting that the Draft of July 23, 1990 (W/76) contemplated the creation of a Joint Expert 
Group designated to advise the TRIPS Committee when requested). 
 53. See WTO, International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer 
Status to WTO Bodies, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/igo_obs_e.htm (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2009). 
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limited to legal and technical assistanceto providing the WTO 
with copies and translations of domestic legislation and to 
assisting WTO members in meeting their obligations.54 
This Article takes up the institutional design question of 
how to create an intellectual property system responsive to 
changing circumstances by examining how the WTO can best 
make use of WIPOs experience and expertise in intellectual 
property matters. After considering the intellectual property 
cases decided to date by the WTO dispute settlement body and 
determining the ways in which they have relied on the text and 
negotiating histories of, and other materials relevant to, WIPO 
conventions to elucidate TRIPS obligations, we suggest some 
revisions to interpretive approaches pursued thus far by dispute 
settlement panels. We point out methodologies that would leaven 
and cabin the trade perspective, and thus allow the WTO to 
capitalize on WIPOs experience and on WIPO developments that 
cope with the dynamic nature of intellectual property and the 
changing landscape of knowledge production. Our analysis is also 
meant for broader application, for developing a design that 
permits productive input from all the international institutions 
that have interests touching on intellectual property norm 
development.55 
In suggesting that the WTO adopt a broader perspective, we 
are cognizant of the well-honed argument that the WTO should 
confine its attention to trade law and that to incorporate 
principles developed outside of the WTO would sacrifice goals of 
legitimacy, uniformity, and predictability.56 While we do not 
                                                          
 54. WTO/WIPO Agreement, supra note 37, arts. 2, 4. In the Doha Round, the TRIPS 
Council was asked to explore the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), but there is no formal agreement between the 
Council and the CBD Secretariat to date. See Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Cooperation with WTO, http://www.cbd.int/incentives/coop-wto.shtml (last visited Sept. 
21, 2009) (indicating that the CBD Executive Secretary continues to seek observer status 
at TRIPS Council meetings). 
 55. The World Health Organization (WHO), for example, is also considering the 
question of development and essential medicines. See Jack Lerner, Intellectual Property 
and Development at WHO and WIPO, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 257, 271 (2008). 
 56. See, e.g., Joshua Meltzer, Interpreting the WTO AgreementsA Commentary on 
Professor Pauwelyns Approach, 25 MICH. J. INTL L. 917, 920−21 (2004) (questioning use 
of non-WTO sources); Joel P. Trachtman, Book Review, 98 AM. J. INTL L. 855, 858 (2004) 
(reviewing PAUWELYN, supra note 44) (same). Arguments have also been made that WIPO 
should not be linked to other organizations. See WIPO, General Report of the Assemblies 
of the Member States of WIPO, ¶ 178, WIPO Doc. A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999) (statement of 
Argentina), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_34/a_34_16.pdf 
(arguing that processes at WIPO establishing binding links between WIPO member states 
and other international organizations or instruments would create legal uncertainty and 
might seriously endanger the international legal responsibility of WIPO Member 
States). 
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advocate that the WTO Agreement become a world constitution, 
we nonetheless believe that there are consequences to the 
decision to link trade to other interests. This is particularly true 
when the linkage is to an area as dynamic as intellectual 
property, and that has such a strong potential impact on 
economic welfare.57 As lawmaking continues to shift from 
sovereigns acting alone to states acting in concert, the 
international organizations they form must increasingly take on 
the tasks once left to sovereigns, including the duty of finding 
ways to accommodate each others needs and to maximize joint 
interests. 
II. THE ROLE OF WIPO AND ITS CONVENTIONS 
IN INTERPRETING TRIPS: THE STORY SO FAR 
It is one thing to recognize that WIPO could help the WTO 
internalize and update intellectual property norms. Developing 
effective mechanisms for importing intellectual property values 
into TRIPS is quite another matter. Aside from the many 
intentional differences between the agreements each 
organization administers, there are discontinuities, 
inconsistencies, and divergent capacities to deal with changing 
circumstances. Transposing provisions from one context into 
another is fraught with error-making possibilities. Furthermore, 
there are no authoritative interpretations of the WIPO 
instruments.58 Neither Berne nor Paris even specifies what 
                                                          
 57. We are heartened to see that similar observations have been made about the 
relationship between trade and human rights law. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Sub-Commn on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Mainstreaming the 
Right to Development into International Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade 
Organization, ¶¶ 25−30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (June 9, 2004) (prepared by 
Robert Howse). 
 58. In theory, obligations under the Berne and Paris Conventions can be enforced 
in the International Court of Justice. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works art. 33(1), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and 
amended on Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 28(1), Mar. 
20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. However, no cases have been brought there. Nor is WIPO in a position to 
offer strictly authoritative readings of its own conventions:  
Under [Article 15(5) of] the Paris Convention, the [International] Bureau [of 
WIPO] is required to conduct studies and provide services designed to facilitate 
the protection of industrial property. On the other hand, it has no power to 
pronounce on interpretation or application of the Convention and so may express 
no opinion on the merits of contested views between Member States. 
Cornish, supra note 50, at 337. In practice, WTO dispute settlement panels have made 
extensive use of leading works on the WIPO conventions, such as Ricketson on the Berne 
Convention, and Bodenhausen on the Paris Convention, the latter of which was authored 
by a leading WIPO official and published by BIRPI. However, on occasion, panels have 
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interpretive sources are appropriate. TRIPS refers to customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law59generally 
taken to mean the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.60 
But, formally, the Vienna Convention discusses prior and 
subsequent treaties; it does not deal with agreements 
incorporated by reference.61 The following Part explores the 
problems created by incorporation and how they have been 
resolved to date. 
A. Relying on Incorporated Provisions 
In theory, the incorporation of WIPO measures into the 
TRIPS Agreement should be straightforward and lead to a 
successful amalgamation of intellectual property values with 
trade objectives. Articles 2.1 and 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
state that WTO members must comply with the principal articles 
of the Paris and Berne Conventions. At the same time, TRIPS 
makes clear how far incorporation extends; Article 9.1 dis-
incorporates Berne Article 6bis (which addresses moral rights), 
and Article 2.2 states that there is nothing in the substantive 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that derogates from the 
obligations incurred under the Paris, Berne, or Rome 
Conventions, or the treaty on integrated circuits.62 
Havana Club63 illustrates how the incorporation strategy can 
work to preserve the balances struck by the WIPO conventions. 
In that case, the European Communities (EC) challenged a 
                                                          
departed from the interpretations suggested by these preeminent commentaries. See 
Panel Report, United StatesSection 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 6.41, WT/DS160/R 
(June 15, 2000) [hereinafter US-110(5)].  
 59. DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.2. 
 60. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see Steven P. Croley & 
John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to 
National Governments, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 193, 200 (1996) (According to negotiators, this 
admonition [of the DSU] is a direct, albeit implicit, invocation of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.). 
 61. For further discussion of these issues, see Susy Frankel, WTO Application of 
the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law to Intellectual 
Property, 46 VA. J. INTL L. 365, 38587 (2006). 
 62. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 2.2, 9.1. The upshot of this is, inter alia, that even 
where the WTO authorizes a member state to deny intellectual property protection to 
certain works as relief for a WTO treaty violation, this WTO-authorized derogation might 
be a violation of that member states obligations under WIPO conventions. See Ecuador-
Bananas, supra note 31, ¶ 152 (implicitly recognizing that, but declining to pass judgment 
on, whether WTO-authorized relief might conflict with the partys obligations under other 
international agreements). 
 63. Appellate Body Report, United StatesSection 211 of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Havana Club]. 
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provision of U.S. law denying protection to the owners of Cuban 
trademarks and trade names that had been connected to 
businesses confiscated by the Cuban government during the 
Cuban revolution. Relying on Article 6quinquies of the Paris 
Convention (the telle quelle provision), the EC argued that once 
a trademark qualified for registration in its country of origin, 
registration in another member state could not be denied for any 
reason other than those expressly recognized in Article 
6quinquies. In contrast, the United States took the position that 
telle quelle restricted only the ability of the second state to deny 
registration based upon the marks visual form. The Appellate 
Body examined the language of the disputed Paris Convention 
provision and its context, including the Final Protocol of 1883
which it regarded as an integral part of that Convention64as 
well as the Washington Revision Conference of 1911. It also 
consulted a well-known treatise on the Paris Convention.65 In the 
end, it concluded that the drafters of the Paris Convention did 
not intend the result propounded by the EC, either when the 
Convention was first concluded or in its subsequent revisions.66 
In other words, even under Paris and TRIPS obligations, states 
remain substantially free to regulate the registration of 
trademarks under national law, so long as there is no 
interference with their form.67 
The opinion is at least as significant for what the Appellate 
Body did not do as for what it did. The EC had criticized the 
Panel that initially resolved the dispute for resorting directly to 
the negotiation history of the Paris Convention instead of relying 
first on the rules of the Vienna Convention,68 which, per Article 
32, would have required an ambiguity before resort could be 
made to background materials.69 Had the Appellate Body adopted 
                                                          
 64. Id. ¶ 145. 
 65. Id. ¶ 138 (citing G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS REVISED AT 
STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 110−11 (1969)). Another report is to similar effect, citing a broad 
array of treatises and other works to determine the nature of Berne rights. See Panel 
Report, ChinaMeasures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, ¶¶ 7.106, 7.126, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China-
Enforcement] (citing four treatises and a WIPO guide). Of course, it is not unusual for 
international tribunals to make substantial use of treatise writers. See IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2324 (6th ed. 2003). 
 66. Havana Club, supra note 63, ¶ 141; see generally id. ¶¶ 13048 (explaining the 
Appellate Bodys reasoning).  
 67. But see Paris Convention, supra note 58, arts. 6bis, 6ter (requiring member 
states to deny trademark rights in certain claimed marks). 
 68. Havana Club, supra note 63, ¶ 19. 
 69. Cf. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.41 (We note that Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the application of successive treaties is not relevant in this respect, 
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this circuitous approach, the meaning of the TRIPS Agreement 
would have been determined in the first instance through a trade 
lens: if a term appeared unambiguous when seen from that 
perspective, that trade-oriented meaning would have 
automatically prevailed, regardless of its impact on creative 
production.70 By instead allowing decisionmakers to consider the 
Paris Convention and its associated materials directly, this 
approach ensured that the sensibilities of intellectual property 
were brought into play. Since intellectual property is aimed at 
striking a balance between the demands of right holders and 
other national interests, the Appellate Bodys direct approach 
leaves WTO members with greater latitude to tailor their law to 
their domestic intellectual agendas (so long, of course, as their 
policies are consistent with the explicit provisions of TRIPS and 
the trade objectives of the WTO agreements).71 
B. Dealing with Potential Discrepancies Between TRIPS and the 
Incorporated Conventions 
The simplicity of this direct approach can, however, be 
deceptive. For one, there are situations in which TRIPS sets out 
a rule that, while attempting to incorporate the WIPO 
instruments, appears inconsistent with them.72 But even here, 
DSB adjudicators have often found techniques that valorize 
intellectual property values. To stay with the trademark 
example, Havana Club identified several potential 
discontinuities between TRIPS and the Paris Convention.73 First, 
                                                          
because all provisions of the TRIPS Agreement  including the incorporated Articles 121 
of the Berne Convention (1971)  entered into force at the same point in time.). 
 70. Moreover, most of the panelists serving on dispute panels and on the Appellate 
Body are trained as experts in trade law, not intellectual property law. See WTO, 
Appellate Body Members, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_ 
bio_e.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). 
 71. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, IndiaPatent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India-
Pharmaceuticals]. The Appellate Body Report in India-Pharmaceuticals, which concerned 
the transitional provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, leaves states with maximal 
flexibility. The Appellate Body rejected claims that Indias obligations should be 
augmented by the expectations of other WTO members. Id. ¶¶ 45−48. Furthermore, it 
held that [m]embers . . . are free to determine how best to meet their obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement within the context of their own legal systems. Id. ¶ 59. The China-
Enforcement Panel also recognized Chinas substantial discretion to order border 
measures that balanced right holders interests and public needs. See China-Enforcement, 
supra note 65, ¶¶ 7.240−.374, 7.481, 7.602. 
 72. We deal separately below with cases where TRIPS clearly and intentionally 
imposes greater obligations on member states. TRIPS was a Berne-plus and Paris-plus 
convention, so these are to be expected. See infra text accompanying notes 113−127. 
 73. A similar impulse to avoid exploiting textual ambiguities to insert a wedge 
between the trade and intellectual property conventions can be seen in EC-GI, supra note 
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Article 2 of TRIPS explicitly incorporates Article 8 of the Paris 
Convention, which requires the protection of trade names. 
However, because Article 1 of TRIPS limits the scope of the 
Agreement to the subject matter listed in Sections 1 through 7 of 
Part IInone of which explicitly includes trade namesthe 
Havana Club Panel took the position (argued by the United 
States) that trade name disputes could not be brought in the 
WTO.74 The Appellate Body reversed. Relying on Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention to interpret the TRIPS Agreement,75 it 
accorded primacy to the WIPO instrument: To adopt the Panels 
approach would be to deprive Article 8 of the Paris 
Convention . . . of any and all meaning and effect.76 
A second question in Havana Clubon ownership
presented something of the opposite question. The EC contended 
that the TRIPS Agreements references to the undertakings of 
trademark holders set out rules on ownership, even though the 
Paris Convention did not appear to cover the matter.77 Clearly, 
the TRIPS Agreement does contain instances where it expressly 
augments or elaborates on the obligations of the earlier WIPO 
conventions. Here, in contrast, the ECs contention would have 
required the Panel to imply an enhancement that was not clear 
on the face of TRIPS. This time, notwithstanding that the claim 
appeared to rest on the meaning of TRIPS alone, the Panel 
looked first at the Paris Convention, asking whether it addressed 
                                                          
29. In that case, the United States alleged that the ECs regime for the protection of 
geographical indications violated a number of national treatment obligations, including, 
inter alia, Article 3 of TRIPS and Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention (incorporated by 
Article 2.1 of TRIPS). However, Article 3 of TRIPS is textually slightly different than 
Article 2(1) of Paris: Article 3 of TRIPS parrots trade-treaty formulations and talks of 
offering treatment no less favourable to foreign nationals, TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3.1, 
while the Paris Convention (like the Berne Convention) refers to ensuring for foreign 
nationals the advantages that . . . laws now grant, or may hereafter grant to domestic 
producers. Paris Convention, supra note 58, art. 2(1). Although the Panel set out to 
treat these provisions separately, it declined to reach a conclusion on the Paris 
Convention claim because further findings on this claim would not provide any 
additional contribution to a positive solution to this dispute. EC-GI, supra note 29, 
¶ 7.216. 
 74. Panel Report, United StatesSection 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, ¶¶ 8.23−.27, 8.41, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Havana Club Panel]. 
 75. Havana Club, supra note 63, ¶¶ 33341. 
 76. Id. ¶ 338. Of course, it is not implausible that certain parts of the Paris and 
Berne Conventions were not made subject to TRIPS enforcement mechanisms. For 
example, this was true of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. And the statement in 
TRIPS that the obligations set out in the new agreement not derogate from the WIPO 
conventions presupposes the possibility that a WIPO obligation may continue post-TRIPS 
even though not covered by TRIPS. But when the member states wished to exclude a 
WIPO treaty obligation from the WTO enforcement mechanism, they did so expressly. See 
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 9.1. 
 77. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15.1; Havana Club, supra note 63, ¶ 191. 
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the ownership question. To find out, it sent a letter to the 
International Bureau of WIPO requesting factual 
information . . . relevant to the dispute, in particular the 
negotiating history and subsequent developments.78 In response, 
the Director-General stated that nothing in the Paris Convention 
covered ownership and the Panel (apparently) assumed that this 
resolved the question.79 While the Appellate Body in fact 
examined the TRIPS provisions relied upon by the EC, in the end 
it too came to the conclusion that TRIPS did not disturb the 
decision by the negotiators of the Paris Convention to leave the 
question of ownership to member states.80 
A third questionagain raising a question of implied 
augmentation of WIPO-based standards by the trade 
agreementwas similarly answered in a way that did not 
disturb the accommodations reached by the Paris Convention. 
The EC had claimed that Article 15.1 of TRIPS, which set out the 
definition of a trademark, required WTO members to protect 
every sign . . . capable of distinguishing the goods . . . of one 
undertaking81 notwithstanding other state interests. That was 
not the practice under the Paris Convention,82 and the Appellate 
Body once again opted to defer to that understanding: 
   As with our interpretation of Article 6quinquies, here, 
too, we recall that Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention 
(1967), which has become a WTO provision by incorporation 
through Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, reserves to 
each country of the Paris Union the right to determine the 
conditions for filing and registration of trademarks in its 
domestic legislation.83 
As yet, there are no Appellate Body decisions on the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne 
Convention, which imposes many more substantive requirements 
than does the Paris Convention. However, the Panel Report in 
the US-110(5) case suggests that here too, efforts will be made to 
interpret TRIPS in a manner that preserves the flexibilities 
inherent in the antecedent intellectual property conventions. The 
issue in that case was whether the United States, which 
permitted certain establishments to make unauthorized usages 
of musical broadcasts, had violated its obligations under Articles 
                                                          
 78. Havana Club Panel, supra note 74, ¶ 6.1. 
 79. See Havana Club, supra note 63, ¶ 189. 
 80. See id. ¶¶ 19095. 
 81. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15.1. 
 82. See Havana Club, supra note 63, ¶¶ 15565. 
 83. Id. ¶ 165. 
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11 and 11bis, the broadcast and rebroadcast provisions of the 
Berne Convention. Looking at the Berne Convention directly,84 
the Panel endeavored to determine what these provisions 
required. It examined members practices before 1948, when the 
provision was proposed; the General Report that was issued 
contemporaneously with the proposal; and the work of the 
diplomatic conferences at which the provision was adopted.85 The 
Panel noted that throughout this time, members tolerated minor 
exceptionslimited unauthorized performances of copyrighted 
materials. Relying on Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention, it 
concluded: 
In our view, state practice as reflected in the national 
copyright laws of Berne Union members before and after 
1948, 1967 and 1971, as well as of WTO members before 
and after the date that the TRIPS Agreement became 
applicable to them, confirms our conclusion [that] the minor 
exceptions doctrine [forms a part of the context of Articles 
11 and 11bis].86 
Using the negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement
including a document the Negotiating Group asked the 
International Bureau of WIPO to prepare in order to facilitate 
an understanding of the existence, scope and form of generally 
internationally accepted and applied standards/norms for the 
protection of intellectual property87the Panel reasoned that 
absent an indication in the TRIPS Agreement that it intended to 
eliminate the minor exceptions doctrine, the entire Berne 
acquis was incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.88 The Panel 
concluded that it was important to adopt the meaning that 
reconciles the texts of different treaties and avoids a conflict 
between them.89 
Although TRIPS claims to be about trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property, a large part of the rationale for its inclusion 
in the WTO regime is that the effective enforcement machinery of 
trade law provides a mechanism for hardening (WIPO-generated) 
intellectual property norms. These different analyses can be read 
to suggest that where a complaint is in essence an effort to 
enforce an intellectual property norm found in a WIPO 
                                                          
 84. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.41. 
 85. See id. ¶¶ 6.50.54. 
 86. Id. ¶ 6.55. 
 87. Id. ¶ 6.64 (quoting GATT Secretariat, Meeting of the Negotiating Group of 29 
February3 March 1988, Annex, MTN.GNG/NG11/6 (Apr. 8, 1988)). 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 6.62.66.  
 89. Id. ¶ 6.66. 
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Convention through the opportunity for dispute settlement 
within the WTO framework, panels will respect the intellectual 
property origins of the dispute. 
C. Use of WIPO Conventions by Analogy 
In some cases, WIPO treaties utilize terminology similar to 
that used in the TRIPS Agreement. Where the meaning in the 
WIPO instrument is clear, it can be consulted to infuse the 
TRIPS Agreement with an intellectual property perspective. The 
EC-GI case provides an example. One issue in that case was 
whether the ECs rules on protecting geographic indications 
violated the national treatment provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement by applying different rules to geographic indications 
pointing to territories outside the EU. The EC argued that the 
differential rules did not amount to a discrimination based on 
nationality because certain foreign nationals had, in fact, 
acquired protection under the challenged EC Regulation.90 The 
Panel rejected the argument on the ground that these rights 
were derived through subsidiaries located in the EC. To 
buttress its conclusion that TRIPS treated discrimination 
according to residence and establishment as close substitutes 
for nationality-based discrimination, the Panel looked at how 
the terms were used in other pre-existing intellectual property 
instruments.91 
Relying on WIPO conventions in this manner is, however, 
fraught with possibilities for mistake. Importantly, the EC-GI 
Panel relied on the connection between TRIPS and the Paris 
Convention because the interpretation the Panel proposed was 
consistent with the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement.92 
Elsewhere in its report, the Panel rejected efforts to incorporate 
from the Paris Convention definitions of terms used but 
undefined in TRIPS.93 The Panel thus showed some sensitivity to 
when (and when not) to use analogous terms in the pre-existing 
conventions. Attention must also be paid to the historical context 
in which the various agreements were negotiated. Otherwise, the 
attempted analogy can seriously misfire. 
One example of this type of miscalculation can be seen from 
the way in which the TRIPS Agreements own attempts to 
                                                          
 90. EC-GI, supra note 29, ¶ 7.197. 
 91. See id. ¶ 7.198. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 7.198.199. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 7.170.171 (concluding the Paris Convention does not provide the 
meaning of interested party for purposes of Articles 22 and 23 of TRIPS). 
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achieve a measure of balance have been interpreted. Thus, each 
of the principal intellectual property areas covered by TRIPS 
includes a provision on exceptions.94 Although they are all 
different, their formats are similar: a multi- (usually three-) part 
test that allows members to limit intellectual property rights so 
long as they do not overly conflict with normal exploitation of the 
protected work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the right holder.95 Except for the copyright test, all explicitly 
permit adjudicators to also consider the interests of third parties. 
There have been three panel decisions interpreting the 
exceptions: (1) the aforementioned US-110(5); (2) Canada-
Pharmaceuticals, which challenged Canadas decision to permit 
generic drug makers to test pharmaceuticals and stockpile them 
prior to patent expiration;96 and (3) the part of the EC-GI dispute 
in which the United States claimed that the ECs protection for 
geographic indications impinged on trademark rights. 
In these cases, adjudicators left members with leeway to 
reconcile conflicting TRIPS obligations (e.g., the conflict between 
GIs and trademarks, which are both protected by TRIPS) and to 
prevent right holders from benefiting from exclusive terms in 
excess of those mandated by TRIPS (e.g., to exploit the de facto 
exclusivity available to pharmaceutical companies by reason of 
the need for premarket clearance). At the same time, however, 
the decisions severely hamper the states ability to accommodate 
national interests in any manner that constitutes a true 
exceptionthat is, a genuine intrusion into a TRIPS obligation. 
The panels ignored the domestic rationales for the challenged 
legislation,97 they considered the various parts of the tests 
cumulatively (which meant that the interests of third parties 
were not reached),98 and they largely refused to interpret terms 
                                                          
 94. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 13 (copyrights), 17 (trademarks), 26.2 (industrial 
designs), 30 (patents). The patent provisions of the Agreement also permit exclusions 
from protection for certain important public purposes. See id. arts. 27.2.3. Article 31 
gives a modicum of authority to offer compulsory licenses. 
 95. The trademark provision is only a two-part test because it does not consider 
normal exploitation of the work. See id. art. 17 (allowing for limited exceptions provided 
they take account of the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and third parties). 
There are also differences in wording among the other three provisions. 
 96. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38. 
 97. For example, the copyright exception test, like the Berne Convention, uses the 
term special. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13; Berne Convention, supra note 58, art. 
9(2). That could have been used to examine the justification for the measure; instead it 
was taken to mean clearly defined. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶¶ 6.107.110. On options 
for examining the justifications, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and 
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
733, 751 n.73 (2001); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Dynamics, supra note 21, at 10109. 
 98. See, e.g., Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶¶ 7.20.21. 
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like normal, legitimate, prejudice, and unreasonable 
normatively.99 Instead, adjudicators did little more than 
mechanically count the number of rights within the bundle 
affected by the challenged provision, or the number of situations 
in which the exception was applicable. Every right received equal 
weight, no matter how small the impact on the right holders 
market.100 Markets the right holder had never utilized were 
counted equivalently to those that it had. Economic effects were 
regarded as paramount, and estimates of loss were extremely 
generous.101 At the end of the day, Canada and the United 
States were not permitted to make allowances for user 
interests. 
What appears to have happened is that the panels relied too 
heavily on the provenance of these tests. All are based on a three-
part exceptions test found in Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention,102 and the panels may have assumed that because 
the tests derived from a WIPO instrument, they would 
automatically balance user and producer interests appropriately. 
Apparently, the panels did not appreciate how radically the 
context changed when these provisions were adapted for TRIPS. 
                                                          
 99. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO 
Panel Decision and the Three-Step Test for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT DAUTEUR 3, 17 (2001). To be sure, the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals Panel considered the practices of other states to determine the patent 
holders legitimate interests, and it was not persuaded that they demonstrated a 
consensus position. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶¶ 7.78.82. Likewise, the 
EC-GI Panel made good on the assertion of the Canada-Pharmaceuticals Panel that 
legitimate interests could only make sense as a normative claim calling for protection of 
interests that are justifiable in the sense that they are supported by relevant public 
policies or other social norms. EC-GI, supra note 29, ¶ 7.663 (quoting Canada-
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶ 7.69). Although its determination of the relevant social 
purposes was drawn largely from TRIPS, the Panel did take notice of the differences 
between Article 17 of TRIPS and the Berne Convention Article 9 antecedent. See id. 
¶ 7.671. It also took into account the broader principle of discretion regarding precise 
implementation found in Article 1.1 of TRIPS. See id. ¶ 7.682. 
 100. To be sure, Canada-Pharmaceuticals rejected the idea of simply counting rights. 
Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶ 7.32. But it refused to consider whether some 
rights are more important than others and in fact appeared to do no more than count 
rights. See id. ¶ 7.33.34. 
 101. For example, the US-110(5) Panel found that EC copyright holders could lose as 
much as $53.65 million per year. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.253. Later, an arbitrator 
found the amount was only  1,219,900 per year (this at a time when a dollar and a euro 
were close to parity). Award of the Arbitrators, United StatesSection 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1, 
WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 102. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention provides: It shall be a matter for 
legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in 
certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author. Berne Convention, supra note 58, art. 9(2). 
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The Berne Convention test was formulated to protect only the 
reproduction right. Because, for most works, copyright holders 
make the bulk of their profits through control over reproduction, 
it is not surprising that Berne might be read to impose firm 
limits on interferences with the exploitation of that right.103 The 
panels failed to consider the ramification of transposing the 
measure into TRIPS, where it applies to all user activities, to all 
markets, and to all of the principal intellectual property regimes. 
The language of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention was altered 
and tailored to each regime; the panels might have accorded 
some significance to those changes. 
The opportunity to consider this issue actually arose in the 
US-110(5) case, where the EC asked the Panel to consider how 
Article 13 of TRIPS, the copyright test, applied to rightslike 
the rebroadcast rightthat were not within the ambit of Bernes 
exceptions test.104 Consistent with the desire to reflect prior 
intellectual property conventions discussed above, the Panel 
rather easily concluded that the TRIPS Agreement need not lead 
to different standards from those applicable under the Berne 
Convention.105 However, in arriving at that conclusion, it 
considered only half the question. As framed by the EC, the issue 
was whether TRIPS should be read to narrow the ambit of 
exceptions. The Panel never seriously addressed the question of 
whether TRIPS had adapted the exceptions to deal with new 
situations. Had the Panel done so, it might well have reached a 
different conclusion. After all, the Panel claimed that it was 
reconciling Article 13 with the minor exceptions doctrine.106 Yet, 
the minor exceptions that it identifieduse of music by religious, 
military, and educational institutions107were surely uses the 
right holders could have otherwise exploited. If the Panel had 
conducted the thought experiment of applying its interpretation 
of Article 13 to these uses, it might have seen the fallacy in its 
analysis and realized that when individual rights are considered 
in isolation, without giving any thought to their significance 
within the copyright bundle or to the impact of a use on the 
total potential revenue of the right holder, members are straight-
jacketed. Rather than grandfathering in existing practices, the 
Panel might have understood the need to develop normative 
                                                          
 103. See 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS, THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 11.01, at 622 (2d ed. 2006). 
 104. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶¶ 6.71.78. 
 105. Id. ¶ 6.81. 
 106. See id. ¶ 6.90. 
 107. See id. ¶ 6.36. 
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positions on what constitutes normal exploitation, unreasonable 
prejudice, and legitimate expectations.108 
The simplistic importation of the Berne approach to 
exceptions into TRIPS also ignores differences in the intellectual 
property traditions of the WTO membership. The Berne 
Convention was largely a product of the droit dauteur 
approach to protecting works of authorship; common law 
countries tend to have a more utilitarian view. The United 
States, for instance, did not join the Berne Convention until 
1988, and it never fully complied with all of its requirements 
(which is why Article 6bis of the Berne Convention was excluded 
from TRIPS).109 The United States also has an open-ended 
approach to unauthorized uses. Like the three-step test, its key 
exceptions provision uses a factors approach.110 Significantly, 
however, the factors are evaluated on a sliding scale.111 Thus, it is 
almost inconceivable that U.S. negotiators understood 
themselves to be agreeing to the cumulative approach adopted by 
the US-110(5) and Canada-Pharmaceuticals Panels.112 Had DSU 
adjudicators considered the traditions of the WTO membership, 
they might have been less eager to understand use of the Berne 
framework for exceptions as license to import its interpretive 
regime into TRIPS. They might thus have arrived at a more 
accommodating view of the three-step tests. Instead, the Panel 
decision was a rather bare vindication of intellectual property 
rights as nothing more than commodities to be traded. The Panel 
looked to antecedent intellectual property sources, but it did not 
                                                          
 108. The Canada-Pharmaceuticals case is somewhat similar. The Panel in that case 
also canvassed the laws of other countries. Although it held that the subsequent acts by 
individual countries did not constitute practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation within the meaning 
of Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention, Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, 
¶ 7.47, it did appear to consider them when determining the legitimate interests of right 
holders. See id. ¶¶ 7.78.79 (Taken as a whole, these government decisions may 
represent either disagreement [regarding the proposed interpretation], or they may 
simply represent that such [an interpretation is] outweighed by other equally legitimate 
interests.). 
 109. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 9.1; see, e.g., Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights 
and Fixing the Dastar Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 66566 (discussing U.S. resistance 
to the adoption of Article 6bis). 
 110. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 111. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
19782005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (studying the correlations between the outcomes 
of individual factor analyses and the outcome of the fair use claim overall). 
 112. Cf. Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNATL L. 75, 11415, 12729 (2000) (It was strongly evident throughout the 
debates over accession that the international community, including the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, was willing to accept less than full compliance in exchange for the 
increased importance that U.S. accession would bring to the Berne Convention.). 
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understand the richer complexity of those intellectual property 
norms. 
D. Coping with TRIPS Standards Expressly Different than the 
WIPO Conventions 
Although the previous sections demonstrated that relying on 
WIPO instruments will often serve as a way to preserve 
intellectual property values, more intractable problems arise in 
situations in which TRIPS expressly adds to the requirements of 
the WIPO agreements. This is especially true with regard to 
patents, where the Paris Convention did little more than 
facilitate seriatim patent applications and establish limits on 
certain types of compulsory licenses.113 In contrast, the TRIPS 
Agreement requires protection of inventive developments in all 
fields of technology, sets a minimum term of protection and 
minimum rights, and further restricts compulsory licensing.114 
Even for copyright and trademarks, TRIPS goes beyond the 
WIPO instruments. For trademarks, the subject matter of 
protection is elucidated and the scope of trademark rights is 
expanded;115 the provisions on copyright and related rights 
mandate new protection for computer programs and rentals, 
phonograms, and performances.116 Furthermore, TRIPS 
establishes obligations regarding other forms of intellectual 
property, including geographic indications,117 industrial designs,118 
and trade secrets.119 In all these areas, TRIPS also adds norms of 
enforcement.120 
The Appellate Bodys decision in the Canada-Patent Term 
case illustrates what can occur when a dispute concerns one of 
these new areas, where by definition there is no ready WIPO 
source to which a panel can refer. In that case, the United States 
claimed that Canada had violated Article 33 of the TRIPS 
Agreement by failing to extend the terms of patents that had 
issued before the Agreement had entered into force, but which 
continued to subsist afterwards. Canada claimed that Article 70, 
which required the protection of existing subject matter, was not 
                                                          
 113. Paris Convention, supra note 58, arts. 2, 45. 
 114. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 2731. 
 115. See id. arts. 1521. 
 116. See id. arts. 1014. TRIPS also increases the level of international protection 
accorded integrated circuits. See id. arts. 3538. 
 117. See id. arts. 2224. 
 118. See id. arts. 2526. 
 119. See id. art. 39. 
 120. See id. arts. 4161. 
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relevant to acts that transpired before the Agreement applied
including the act of awarding a patent for a specific term of 
years.121 
Had the issue of retroactivity arisen in a WIPO negotiation, 
the problem might have been conceptualized as balancing 
accessibility interests against the claims of those holding pending 
patents. Because these right holders had sunk all their 
investments under the prior regime in reliance on the rewards 
that would be generated during an (arguably) shorter time 
period, the negotiators might well have decided not to require the 
retroactive extension of patent terms.122 But the Paris Convention 
did not deal with patent duration. Accordingly, its negotiators 
never had occasion to consider the retroactivity issue.123 The 
Appellate Body was thus left with nothing but definitions in the 
intellectual property component of a trade agreement. It duly 
consulted the Paris Convention as well as a WIPO treatise to 
determine the meaning of acts.124 But without apparently 
weighing the interests involved, the Appellate Body concluded 
that the length of the term was a right and not the result of the 
act of granting a patent; it thus held the TRIPS term to apply 
retroactively.125 The adjudicators were equally undeferential to 
Canadas own weighing of the intereststhe Panel rejected 
Canadas argument that its term (seventeen years from issuance, 
as opposed to the TRIPS Agreements twenty years from filing) 
was effectively compliant with TRIPS.126 Canada was thus left 
with no flexibility to protect the public from windfall gains by 
right holders.127 
                                                          
 121. See Appellate Body Report, CanadaTerm of Patent Protection, ¶¶ 1018, 
WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Patent Term]. 
 122. This is particularly likely had the negotiators focused on the type of patents 
mainly at issue in Canada-Patent Term, namely, patents covering pharmaceuticals. See 
Press Release, Dept of Foreign Affairs & Intl Trade Can., Backgrounder, WTO Appellate 
Body Report on U.S. Challenge of Canadas Patent Term, (Sept. 18, 2000) (discussing the 
potential impact of the Canada-Patent Term decision on pharmaceutical sales in Canada). 
 123. Significantly, the Berne Convention does contain a provision on the retroactivity 
issuea complex provision that makes retroactivity turn on whether the work remains 
protected in its country of origin. See Berne Convention, supra note 58, art. 18. 
 124. Canada-Patent Term, supra note 121, ¶ 54 n.40 (citing the Paris Convention, 
supra note 58, art. 4B, and WIPO, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY 
AND PRACTICE ¶¶ 7.78.85, at 13435 (1997)). 
 125. See Canada-Patent Term, supra note 121, ¶¶ 5660. 
 126. Id. ¶¶ 80101. 
 127. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention, which sets out a rule of non-retroactivity 
with respect to acts and facts predating a treaty, might have also furnished the Appellate 
Body with a vehicle for giving Canada the flexibility to strike this balance on its own. 
However, the adjudicators instead used Article 28 to reject Canadas position by reasoning 
that a rule that refers to a situation which ceased to exist could not apply to subsisting 
patents. Id. ¶¶ 7279. Arguably, the Canada-Pharmaceuticals Panels decision to consider 
(5) DREYFUSS 12/22/2009 8:46:22 PM 
1212 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:4 
E. Using Post-TRIPS WIPO Developments to Inform TRIPS 
There is yet another reason why the full range of relevant 
intellectual property values cannot be integrated into TRIPS 
merely through the incorporation of the WIPO instruments: as 
we noted at the outset, social, economic, and technological 
situations change. The WIPO conventions that we have discussed 
thus far were adopted prior to the conclusion of TRIPS. But new 
rights are needed to respond to evolving technological conditions 
(such as the delocalization of digitized works), and new 
exceptions are necessary to accommodate new practices (such as 
open innovation). Furthermore, as developing and emerging 
nations begin to cope with intellectual property protection, they 
are finding approaches to interest-balancing that are different 
from the methods traditionally utilized by the developed world.128 
While TRIPS leaves members free to increase the level of their 
own domestic protection, many of these developments require a 
collective response. Under current conditions, these responses 
are taking place outside the WTO, including in WIPO, thus 
raising the question whether new (or newly modified) WIPO 
instruments should also be factored into the interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
To many commentators, the answer is clearly no. Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention permits the use of a treaty or rule of 
international law to interpret another agreement, but only when 
all of the parties have agreed to both measures or accept that 
there is an interpretive relationship between them. Because the 
parties to the WTO are not all signatories of the WIPO 
instruments, strict application of the Vienna Convention would 
suggest that evolution in WIPO cannot affect TRIPS; that the 
only way to change the rights and obligations in TRIPS is to 
renegotiate it.129 
But another response is conceivable. While membership in 
the WIPO agreements and the WTO are not coextensive, there 
are very few countries that do not belong to both. For example, 
most of the states that are in WIPO but not the WTO are absent 
                                                          
technological neutrality as a structural constraint, see Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, 
Diversifying, supra note 21, at 44850, applicable to the exceptions test suffered from a 
similar problem: the Paris Convention did not include a similar nondiscrimination clause. 
 128. Indian patent law is a good example. See, e.g., The Patents (Amendment) Act, 
2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d) (raising inventive step); Shamnad Basheer, 
Policy Style Reasoning at the Indian Patent Office, 2005 INTELL. PROP. Q. 309 (noting 
the Indian Patent Offices conservative approach).  
 129. PAUWELYN, supra note 44, at 265. The Panel in the Canada-Pharmaceuticals 
case was similarly reluctant to consider subsequent practices by many of the parties to 
inform the meaning of TRIPS. See supra note 108. 
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for purely political reasons.130 Furthermore, because the WIPO 
agreements constitute the backbone of TRIPS, the existence of 
some relationship between these instruments was evident to all 
WTO members. Neil Netanel, who addressed this question in the 
copyright context, thus concluded that, at least with respect to 
copyright agreements negotiated almost contemporaneously with 
TRIPS, new developments should be taken into account: 
TRIPS drafters must have been well aware [that] the Berne 
Convention is a dynamic instrument . . . and [that] the 
rapid development of copyright-related technology require[s] 
an ongoing process of interpretation and reinterpretation 
within the framework that Berne sets forth.131 
Under Netanels approach, WIPOs elucidations of the terms of 
the instruments it administers would be immediately 
incorporated into TRIPS, either because WTO members should 
be regarded as having agreed to an evolving interpretation of the 
Agreement or because each new interpretation represents a 
subsequent agreement between the parties within Article 
31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention.132 
At least one panel seems to have agreed about the relevance 
of such post-TRIPS developments. In the US-110(5) case, the 
United States argued that the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), 
which was largely designed to deal with the special problem of 
protecting works in a digital era, along with the statements made 
during the negotiation of the WCT, shed light on the meaning of 
the exceptions test in the TRIPS Agreement.133 Although the 
Panel was careful to note that the WCT (which at the time had 
very few signatories) did not formally constitute a subsequent 
agreement within the meaning of Article 31.3, the wording of 
the WCT, and in particular of the Agreed Statement thereto, 
nonetheless supports, as far as the Berne Convention is 
concerned, that the Berne Union members are permitted to 
provide minor exceptions to the rights provided under Articles 11 
and 11bis.134 The Panel went on to say that because the WCT 
                                                          
 130. The only WTO members that are not officially in WIPO are the EC (whose 
members joined WIPO individually), Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan (where there are 
political obstacles), and the Solomon Islands. Vanuatu has observer status at the WTO 
and is not a member of WIPO. Compare WIPO, Member States, 
http://www.wipo.int/members/en (last visited Oct. 21, 2009), with Understanding the 
WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 131. Netanel, supra note 51, at 47172. 
 132. Id. at 46567. 
 133. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.67. 
 134. Id. ¶ 6.69. 
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was unanimously concluded at a diplomatic conference attended 
by 127 countries, most of which also participated in TRIPS 
negotiations, it is relevant to seek contextual guidance . . . in the 
WCT.135 
In a sense, it is no wonder that the DSB has taken this line. 
As noted in the Introduction, the right rules for intellectual 
property are something of a moving target. As countries become 
increasingly developed, they encounter competition from emerging 
nations; as they cope with the challenges and opportunities of new 
technologies, needs change. The accommodations that were 
appropriate in the 1990s, when TRIPS was negotiated, are 
unlikely to be appropriate forever. To the extent that WIPO is 
more nimble than the WTOmore adept at finding coordinated 
responses to new developmentsits input is invaluable. 
III. INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES AND RELEVANT SOURCES 
The impasse in WTO lawmaking, coupled with the relatively 
few intellectual property cases adjudicated by the DSBand by 
the Appellate Body in particularpresent both a problem and an 
opportunity. Until WTO lawmaking becomes more robust, 
nations will have difficulties accommodating changing 
circumstances. They will undoubtedly require new intellectual 
property legislation to deal with new challenges but will often be 
required to live with the uncertainly of not knowing whether 
these laws comply with their international obligations.136 
Furthermore, nations must deal with a distorted political 
economy.137 Because TRIPS is a minimum standards regime, 
those interested in strong intellectual property protection can 
cite TRIPS in support of their legislative agendas and can use the 
threat of a TRIPS challenge to block moves intended to safeguard 
the public interest. At the same time, however, the fluidity of the 
current regime makes this a good time to ponder the interpretive 
approaches that are best able to maintain a productive creative 
                                                          
 135. Id. ¶ 6.70. 
 136. TRIPS Council reviews can, of course, provide some (non-authoritative) 
guidance on laws that have been enacted. See Paul Vandoren, The Implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, 2 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 25, 29 (1999). However, it does not provide 
advice formally through existing review mechanisms on whether proposed legislation is 
compatible with TRIPS. 
 137. For example, Indian law aimed at preventing evergreening has been heavily 
criticized on TRIPS-compatibility grounds. See Posting of Tushar Dhara, Thoughts on the 
Gleevac Controversy, to India Unplugged (Mar. 14, 2008), http://arthedains.com/ 
indiaunplugged/2008/03/14/87 (outlining the objections of pharmaceutical companies to the 
Indian Patents Act on the grounds that the statutory provision was vague and ambiguous 
and contrary to the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement and the Indian constitution). 
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environment in the face of changing needs. As we previously 
suggested, generous and informed use of the intellectual property 
expertise at WIPO (and, by extension, other international 
organizations with an interest in intellectual property) is a 
necessary part of the solution. But encouraging panels to put 
TRIPS in its historical (Berne/Paris-derived) context and to take 
account of post-TRIPS international developments will not be 
enough in and of itself, as existing panel reports show. As the 
WTO thinks through the problem of interpreting the Agreement 
in new contexts and incorporating intellectual property values 
into a trade framework, it will hopefully address the following 
issues. 
A. The Role of the TRIPS Agreements Principles and Objectives 
in Interpretation 
One problem that emerges clearly from studying the existing 
case law is that a strategy for balancing interests and responding 
to change that relies solely on the bare text of the incorporated 
WIPO conventions is likely to fail. Despite the valiant efforts of 
the Appellate Body in Havana Club (and in other cases as well138) 
to preserve flexibility for member states by relying on WIPO 
conventions for guidance, there are too many inconsistencies, 
differences, and transpositional errors for this strategy to fully 
succeed. 
Significantly, however, TRIPS furnishes its own guidance, 
quite apart from the multi-part exceptions tests discussed 
earlier. The Objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are stated in 
Article 7 as the use of intellectual property rights to promote 
innovation to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare.139 Furthermore, Article 8 (Principles) permits members 
to adopt measures that protect public health and promote sectors 
of vital interest to their economies and to technological 
development (so long as they are consistent with the 
Agreement).140 So far, these provisions have not played an 
important interpretive role. Indeed, the Canada-Pharmaceuticals 
Panel essentially wrote them off, rejecting the claim that they 
should be used to determine whether Canadas policies on behalf 
of generic competition fall within the patents exception provision. 
                                                          
 138. See, e.g., supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing India-
Pharmaceuticals). Some panels have been similarly conciliatory, as the China-
Enforcement case demonstrates. Id. 
 139. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7. 
 140. Id. art. 8.1. 
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While the Panel agreed that the sentiments expressed in the 
Objectives and Principles had to be borne in mind, it also 
warned against using these provisions to alter the deal struck in 
the Uruguay Round.141 
As Peter Yu so convincingly argues, that reluctance to 
impose a purposive gloss must change.142 The Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health specifically stated 
that each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the 
light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in 
particular, in its objectives and principles.143 The status of the 
Declaration is not entirely clear (it too is a post-TRIPS 
development that arguably should be taken into account in 
interpreting the Agreement).144 What is clear, however, is that 
the commitments expressed in the Objectives and Principles 
would go a long way toward providing a normative dimension to 
the exceptions test that was absent in both the US-110(5) and 
the Canada-Pharmaceuticals cases.145 A perspective informed by 
these provisions would be similarly useful in considering other 
issues, such as the structural relations between the various parts 
of the Agreement146 (an issue that arose, with unsatisfying 
results, in Canada-Pharmaceuticals147), and the role that should 
be played by a states stated rationale for enacting a challenged 
action.148 
                                                          
 141. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶ 7.26; see also India-Pharmaceuticals, 
supra note 71, ¶¶ 4348. 
 142. Yu, supra note 27, at 100018.  
 143. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5(a), 
WT/MIN(01)DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). 
 144. See Howse, supra note 57, ¶ 37; PAUWELYN, supra note 44, at 47. 
 145. GERVAIS, supra note 14, at 20609. 
 146. The national treatment and most-favored nation obligations are structural, in 
that they apply to all the forms of intellectual property protection coming within the scope 
of the TRIPS Agreement, even if the protection accorded is in excess of that mandated by 
the Agreement. See EC-GI, supra note 29, ¶¶ 7.130 (national treatment), 7.702 (most-
favored nation). 
 147. In that case, the Panel subjected Canadas research exemption, which had been 
held valid under the three-part exceptions test, to a separate analysis under Article 27.1, 
which requires technological neutrality. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, 
¶¶ 7.84.104. As we have previously explained, treating technological neutrality as 
substantive (as outside the reach of the exceptions test) makes it very difficult to draft an 
exemption limited enough to qualify for an exemption under Article 30. See Dinwoodie & 
Dreyfuss, Diversifying, supra note 21, at 449. It also makes it hard for states to deal with 
the divergent interests of, say, the information technology, financial services, 
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical industries. A different view on the exceptions test may 
not, however, have saved Canadas stockpiling provision as the Panel added another 
constraint on members freedom of action. It treated the nondiscrimination provision in 
Article 27.1 as structuralas a requirement that is not subject to exceptions. See EC-GI, 
supra note 29, ¶¶ 7.91.93. 
 148. See Dinwoodie, supra note 97, at 75051. 
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Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement, on the Nature and Scope 
of Obligations, could also play an anchoring role, for it leaves 
members free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of [the] Agreement within their own 
legal system and practice.149 This restates a fundamental 
assumption of the international intellectual property system: 
international norms confine national policy choices, but they do 
not define them. So far, the reach of this provision is unclear. In 
China-Enforcement, for example, the Panel emphasized, on the 
one hand, that Article 1.1 does not justify derogations from basic 
obligations.150 At the same time, it considered the provision in 
connection with the question whether China was doing enough to 
keep counterfeit goods out of channels of trade and ensuring that 
they did not harm trademark holders reputations. After 
examining how China used these goods to serve public welfare 
interests, it held that China was free to determine the method of 
implementation of its obligations under Article 59 [on remedies] 
in accordance with Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.151 
Further development of Article 1.1 jurisprudence could help 
panels take better account of the varying traditions of its 
members, such as the difference between droit dauteur and 
utilitarian approaches discussed above.152 Similarly, explication of 
Article 1.1 would provide guidance to states about the areas 
where they have most latitude regarding means of 
implementation.153 
B. TRIPS as a Trade Agreement 
In addition to a more nuanced intellectual property 
perspective, and a more purposive reading of the TRIPS 
agreement, adjudicators could also better preserve the balance 
needed in intellectual property law by viewing the TRIPS 
Agreement with its trade-related character consciously in mind. 
Currently, adjudicators tend to look mainly at how states treat 
intellectual property within their borders, largely ignoring effects 
on international trade. Admittedly, the drafters of TRIPS were 
heavily focused on local infringement. Negotiations over 
intellectual property moved to the WTO because WIPO was 
                                                          
 149. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1.1. 
 150. China-Enforcement, supra note 65, ¶ 7.513. 
 151. Id. ¶ 7.323. 
 152. See supra notes 10912 and accompanying text. 
 153. The TRIPS Agreement itself already identifies enforcement measures as an area 
where states are to be given particularly generous room for maneuver. See TRIPS, supra 
note 1, art. 41.5. 
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viewed as hostile to raising domestic levels of intellectual 
property protection, and because the WTO provided a way to pay 
off developing countries for accepting stronger obligations.154 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Agreement is 
denominated Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. Because dispute resolution is only applicable to 
intellectual property by virtue of its nexus to trade, the DSB 
could enable the states to better tailor their intellectual property 
laws to local interests if it focused its attention on the extent to 
which challenged actions specifically encumber or distort trade.155 
For example, in China-Enforcement, on the issue of whether 
China was taking strong enough action to remove infringing 
goods from the channels of commerce, the Panel used a single 
reference in Article 51 (on border measures) to claim that 
members obligations extend only to preventing the importation 
of infringing goods.156 Even though other provisions in the 
Agreement explicitly refer to exportation,157 and the Decision of 
the General Council implementing the Doha Declaration paid 
particular attention to exports,158 the China-Enforcement Panel 
found that states have no duty to prevent their territories from 
becoming information havenshubs for international 
infringement operations. This is not surprising in light of the 
WTOs origins, which focused on barriers to the entry of goods 
into members markets. However, those concerned with trade in 
                                                          
 154. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 46 (2003) (explaining that developed countries 
disfavored WIPO because it lacked enforcement powers and was dominated numerically 
by less developed countries); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 10001 (2007) (noting that developed countries could 
exchange higher intellectual property standards for trade concessions in other areas 
under the WTO framework). 
 155. See Frankel, supra note 61, at 39091. Of course, the reformulation of trade 
theory as grounded in comparative advantage (as opposed to the mere free flow of goods) 
has allowed international regulation a more ready justification for intruding upon purely 
local conditions. See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 7880. But it should not be taken as a 
given that theories of comparative advantage have wholly displaced traditional 
justifications for a trade regime. Courts or other adjudicators charged with effectuating 
traditional trade objectives by ensuring the free movement of goods may in fact view 
territorial intellectual property rights with much greater suspicion. See GRAEME B. 
DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 48 (2d ed. 
2008) (discussing the European Court of Justice). 
 156. China-Enforcement, supra note 65, ¶ 7.224. 
 157. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 51 (allowing members to control goods 
destined for exportation); id. art. 59 (creating a duty to prevent the re-exportation of 
infringing goods). 
 158. World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, ¶ 4, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003). 
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intellectual property need to be concerned about flows in both 
directions. 
A contrast between the US-110(5) case and the stockpiling 
portion of Canada-Pharmaceuticals provides an illustration of 
how requiring a trade nexus might affect the extent to which the 
TRIPS Agreement circumscribes national intellectual property 
lawmaking. Although the complainant won each of the cases, the 
challenged measures were factually different. The United States 
had been permitting rebroadcasts of music in small 
establishments within the United States.159 Since there was no 
possibility of re-rebroadcast abroad, the potential loss of trade 
was extremely limited. It consisted only of the claim that without 
the exemption, the establishments in question would have paid 
licensing fees for the relevant rebroadcasts. In contrast, Canada 
was apparently permitting generic drug companies to stockpile 
drugs for sale around the world;160 thus, Canadas laws had a 
serious potential impact on trade in goods.161 
Perhaps the cases should have come out as they did, but had 
the adjudicators mandated that closer attention be paid to 
impacts on world trade, they would have left states with more 
room to maneuver. In particular, emerging economies would 
benefit from such an approach. They could provide their 
populations with easier access to educational materials and 
training opportunities by raising the inventive step, taking novel 
approaches to the scope of intellectual property rights, or 
adopting new defenses to infringement. Because their 
manufacturing capacities are modest, the activities thus 
permitted would be unlikely to affect world trade in a 
meaningful way (and this would be especially true if they made 
efforts to confine distribution to interstate trade).162 Accordingly, 
such activities might not be regarded as TRIPS violations, even if 
substantially similar actions by developed countries would be.163 
                                                          
 159. See US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 2.5.6. 
 160. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶ 2.1. 
 161. The proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) furnishes an 
interesting contrast. See generally Charles McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235 (2009). 
 162. Cf. Award of the Arbitrators, United StatesSection 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act, Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 4.21.23, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 
(Nov. 9, 2001) (suggesting that harm may vary according to the historical state of the 
market). But see Richard Owens, TRIPs and the Fairness in Music Arbitration: The 
Repercussions, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 49 (2003) (criticizing this reading). 
 163. Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 57. For another example of where this issue arises, 
consider the controversy over the EUs seizure of Indian generic drugs bound for a market 
where they were not protected. See Intervention by India, IndiaSeizure of Generic Drug 
Consignments at EC Ports (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.keionline.org/node/309. 
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To put this another way, instead of using trade as a lens 
through which to filter the scope of international obligations 
imposed by the eponymous TRIPS Agreement, the Appellate 
Body and the panels have largely subsumed the international 
intellectual property system as a whole within the trade 
apparatus. Thus, as noted above, the treatment by panels of 
discrepancies between TRIPS and WIPO conventions suggests 
that it is well understood that intellectual property was 
incorporated into the WTO system in order to take advantage of 
the latters enforcement machinery. But this was a purely 
strategic move. For reasons we have discussed elsewhere, the 
coupling of intellectual property and trade is an uneasy one. The 
relationship is under-theorized in the literature (partly because 
intellectual property was treated exceptionally under Article 
XX(d) of the old GATT regime), and neither the Appellate Body 
nor the TRIPS panels have fully explored the interaction.164 If 
trade-relatedness were made a criterion for determining TRIPS 
compatibility, nations would have more room to adapt their laws 
to domestic needs and to make them responsive to local changes 
in circumstances. 
C. Relying on Multiple Sources 
Our short survey of the TRIPS cases reveals that the panels 
and Appellate Body have on occasion taken an eclectic approach 
                                                          
 164. Any doctrinal exploration that has occurred had been formalistic and motivated 
largely by a desire to maintain internal coherence in the enforcement of TRIPS norms. 
For example, the Appellate Body in Havana Club and the Panel in EC-GI each subjected 
challenged national laws to analysis under the separate national treatment obligations in 
both GATT Article III and TRIPS Article 3, rejecting the contention that compliance with 
one (for example, the GATT provision with its generous exclusion) would automatically 
result in compliance with the other. See EC-GI, supra note 29, ¶ 7.184. And there are 
important differences between the two obligations. GATT national treatment prohibits 
unequal treatment of goods, GATT, supra note 45, art. III, while TRIPS focuses on the 
treatment of nationals. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3. And, most significantly, the 
obligations are subject to different exceptions: TRIPS to provisions taken over from prior 
intellectual property conventions, and GATT to the exclusion of laws necessary for 
protection of intellectual property under Article XX(d). TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 2; GATT, 
supra note 45, art. XX(d). But these approaches are largely grounded in making the 
incorporation of WIPO conventions real and in maintaining internal coherence in the 
enforcement of TRIPS norms. For example, subjecting intellectual property laws to both 
(different) national treatment obligations is important if the incorporation of the national 
treatment obligations of the WIPO conventions is to have any effect; if compliance with 
GATT were sufficient, incorporating the national treatment commitments of Berne and 
Paris would have been unnecessary. Likewise, the EC-GI Panel correctly noted that if it 
allowed the scope of Article 3 of TRIPS to be affected by the potential applicability of 
GATT Article III, it might result in the non-uniform application of Article 3 of TRIPS to 
other intellectual property rights that were not inherently linked to the territorial origin 
of a product. See EC-GI, supra note 29, ¶ 7.184. 
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to the materials they use to interpret the TRIPS Agreement. For 
example, the adjudicators in Havana Club and the US-110(5) 
cases consulted the 1883 Final Protocol to the Paris Convention, 
materials from the 1911 Paris Revision Conference, the General 
Report and materials of the diplomatic conferences leading to the 
inclusion of broadcast rights in the Berne Convention, as well as 
learned treatises interpreting the conventions.165 To be sure, some 
reports place undue reliance on the dictionary,166 and references 
to WIPO materials without proper regard for history and context 
can undermine the intellectual property values at stake. 
Unfamiliar materials must be handled with care. However, 
unless WTO lawmakers are open to a variety of sources, 
intellectual property norm development will be incomplete. 
Furthermore, the cacophancy and recycling created by the 
emerging international IP regime complex will persist. Instead, 
ways must be found to integrate developments from a 
multiplicity of sources. In particular, the Vienna Convention 
allows practices of states to be considered in determining the 
meaning of TRIPS.167 So too might other bilateral and 
multilateral international agreements be taken into account. 
WTO panels should view these sources of law broadly to ensure 
the most intellectual property sensitive reading of the TRIPS 
Agreement. And they should be willing to innovate procedurally 
to optimize their awareness and appreciation of these broader 
materials. 
1. National Practices. Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna 
Convention permits interpretation to be shaped by subsequent 
practices by the parties that reflect on an agreements meaning. 
In the context of TRIPS, there are two time periods to consider: 
practices adopted under the WIPO conventions and practices 
adopted only subsequent to TRIPS. While the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals Panel was reluctant to take account of practices 
in the first time period, even in determining the legitimate 
expectations of patent holders,168 these practices would appear to 
be extremely relevant. They reflect not only on the meaning of 
underlying Paris and Berne obligations, they also shed light on 
what the states thought they were agreeing to when they joined 
the TRIPS Agreement (especially if these practices continued 
                                                          
 165. See supra notes 6465, 85, 124 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Dinwoodie, supra note 47, at 100506. 
 167. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31.3. 
 168. See supra note 108; supra text accompanying note 86. However, the Panel 
expressed skepticism about relying on the laws of individual countries. See Canada-
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38, ¶ 7.82. 
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after TRIPS went into force). And, indeed, the US-110(5) Panel 
was extremely attentive to how WIPO members viewed their 
Berne obligations: it made considerable use of exceptions found 
in different national laws to shed light on the meaning of the 
minor exceptions doctrine that it held to be part of the Berne 
acquis.169 Furthermore, in EC-GI, the Panels decision on whether 
the protection the EC offered geographic indications was unduly 
interfering with trademarks was importantly informed by the 
ways in which the EC had dealt with potential interferences in 
the recent past and by the paucity of confusing simultaneous 
registrations.170 Although such regard might not, as a formal 
matter, satisfy the definition of state practice within the meaning 
of the Vienna Convention,171 the Panels flexibility toward the 
relevance of state practices ensured that the context of how 
international norms operate locally was fully taken into account. 
Among other things, this approach validates the freedom 
expressed in Article 1.1 to implement international obligations in 
ways appropriate to the national regime in question. 
Events post-TRIPS are relevant for many of the same 
reasons. Post-TRIPS practices also speak to a countrys 
understanding of both its TRIPS obligations and the 
requirements of the underlying Paris and Berne Conventions. 
Consulting them contributes to a coherent understanding of the 
international intellectual property regime as a whole.172 More 
                                                          
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 13335. 
 170. EC-GI, supra note 29, ¶¶ 7.573 (on the Budvar issue), 7.667.679 (on how EC 
handled applications), 7.674 (on instances of potential confusion). In its analysis of the 
trademarks exception test, the EC-GI Panel also drew significant support from the 
example of an acceptable practice included in Article 17 of TRIPS, which allows fair use of 
descriptive terms. Id. ¶ 7.655. When TRIPS lawmaking resumes, drafters should keep in 
mind how useful it is to provide adjudicators with such examples. 
 171. Elsewhere in its report, the Panel also looked at implemented laws operating in 
other countries, a method of interpretation that more formally satisfies the understanding 
of state practice in the Vienna Convention. See id. ¶ 7.642. 
 172. See Netanel, supra note 51, at 447 ([S]tate practice under Berne should indeed 
be the fundamental starting point for interpreting Berne-in-TRIPS [the interpretation of 
the Berne provisions as incorporated into TRIPS], although the Berne provisions that are 
incorporated into TRIPS will necessarily be colored by TRIPSs state practice and overall 
object and purpose as well.). The panels appear to have avoided the problems of the pre-
and post-TRIPS dichotomy in dealing with international materials. Thus, the Appellate 
Body has articulated the doctrinal difference between using the preparatory work for the 
TRIPS Agreement and relying on the negotiation history of the Paris and Berne 
Conventions: the former is subject to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention and can be used 
only in the case of ambiguity or unreasonableness; the latter is a constitutive part of 
the parties understanding of their TRIPS commitments. See id. at 460 n.77, 469. 
However, since the relevant time to gauge this understanding is at the conclusion of the 
TRIPS Agreement, relevant sources include not only texts prepared in the run-up to the 
WIPO instruments, but also interpretive materials published prior to the conclusion of 
TRIPS. 
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important, sensitivity to post-TRIPS practices keeps the TRIPS 
Agreement relevant. As noted in the Introduction, intellectual 
property norms are something of a moving target because they 
must respond to changes in technology, the imperatives of 
development, and also to cultural shifts (greater appreciation for 
authenticity, and hence, GIs; greater recognition of human 
rights claims, and therefore access interests). As countries 
attempt to accommodate their contemporary national interests to 
the mandate of TRIPS, new solutions develop. For example, India 
has pioneered a new interpretation of the inventiveness 
requirement.173 Should similar economies adopt the same 
strategy, the emerging consensus should be taken into account in 
interpreting the reference in TRIPS to the inventive step.174 
Similarly, widespread adoption of rules like Germanys on the 
scope of gene patents175 might be interpreted as a response to 
upstream patenting, rather than as an attempt to treat the 
biotechnology sector specially, in violation of the 
nondiscrimination proviso of the TRIPS Agreement.176 The Panel 
in US-110(5) appeared alert to the danger of viewing 
international norms statically and specifically noted that minor 
exceptions were not frozen in 1967 when broadcasting rights 
were added to the Berne Convention.177 Being willing to consider 
national practices across time allows dispute settlement panels 
to decide cases based on the most refined conceptualization of 
available policy levers and in ways relevant to new social and 
technological developments. 
But as helpful as these national sources are, their use is not 
without problems (just as the same was true of a historical use of 
international treaties178). First, there is no reason to believe that 
the parties to the Paris and Berne Conventions fully utilized the 
flexibilities available to them under those instruments. Indeed, 
the opposite is clearly true: developed countries have long had 
trademark and patent laws that vastly exceed the requirements 
of the Paris Convention. Accordingly, while laws that pre-existed 
TRIPS may identify practices that are allowable, no inference 
can be made about whether other measures should also be 
considered permissible.179 
                                                          
 173. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d). 
 174. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.1. 
 175. Patentgesetz, [PatG, Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, as amended by Gesetz, Jan. 21, 
2005, BGBl. I, at 146, § 1a(4) (F.R.G.).  
 176. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.1. 
 177. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 10321. 
 179. This is also important when panels look to commercial practices in particular 
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Second, care must be taken lest national norms adopted in a 
few countries be quickly consolidated at the international level, 
precluding reversal of any national experiments deemed 
unsuccessful. In recent years, the United States (and, to some 
extent, other developed countries) have embarked on a series of 
bilateral trade agreements, often with developing countries, 
which are intended to raise the level of intellectual property 
protection above the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Many fall on the heels of WIPO efforts to expand the Paris or 
Berne Conventions to cover new regimes, and they appear in part 
to be intended to convert WIPOs soft law into genuine 
obligations.180 In effect, however, these agreements are pay-offs: 
they give one country greater access to the others markets in 
exchange for raising the level of protection.181 While many of 
them may be in the contracting parties mutual trading interests, 
they should not be viewed as evidence of how the WIPO 
instruments or the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted. 
Nations that have not received the quid pro quo should not be 
required to nonetheless accord higher levels of protection to 
intellectual products. 
Third, it is important to ensure that grandfatheringthe 
practice of relying on pre-TRIPS practices and materialsdoes 
not end up privileging developed countries, which have evolved a 
considerable repertoire of practices under the Paris and Berne 
Conventions, over developing countries that are so new to 
intellectual property that they have never considered how to 
adjust their implementing legislation to their national interests. 
This problem of privileging the approaches of the developed 
world could be ameliorated simply by incorporating this 
historical understanding into any analysis of state practice or by 
                                                          
states. See Dinwoodie, supra note 97, at 758. The same can be said of learned treatises: 
they may shed light on practices that states were using or had contemplated, but 
omissions do not constitute evidence that a practice is inconsistent with WIPO 
obligations. 
 180. See Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property, Free Trade Agreements 
and Economic Development, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (2007); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its 
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 408 (2006). 
 181. Of course, these agreements look quite different if they are subject to most-
favored-nation obligations. That question is, however, unresolved. An exception for 
bilateral agreements is contained in Article XXIV of the GATT and in the GATS. See 
GATT, supra note 45, art. XXIV; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal 
InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). Although a 
somewhat similar provision was present in drafts of the TRIPS Agreement, it was not 
included in the final version. See Susy Frankel, The Legitimacy and Purpose of 
Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE 185, 
18687 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008). 
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adapting the role of state practice as an interpretative device to 
require consensus across countries of different development.182 
2. Subsequent WIPO Material. The most straightforward 
way to keep TRIPS current with changes in the innovation 
landscape is to take post-TRIPS developments in international 
intellectual property lawmaking into account in interpreting the 
Agreement. Article 31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention allows 
resort to subsequent agreements among all of the parties, and, as 
we saw, the US-110(5) Panel relied on the WCT to interpret the 
copyright exceptions test of the TRIPS Agreement.183 It remains 
to be seen whether the Appellate Body will agree to this 
approach and, if it does, how much further it would go.184 The US-
110(5) Panel was careful to note that the WCT was concluded 
only a year after TRIPS;185 negotiators could not have anticipated 
agreements made much later. The WCT is also a completed 
treaty, although it had not entered into force at the time the 
Panel consulted it.186 More informal WIPO actions, such as the 
Reports of Standing Committees, Model Laws, or the advice 
given by WIPO technical advisors to WTO members, present a 
very different situation. Finally, the WCT is an easy case because 
it deals with the same type of works that are covered by TRIPS, 
and it supplements (increases) the level of intellectual property 
protection.187 Far more tenuous would be the incorporation of 
instruments that recognize rights in new kinds of subject 
matterdatabases, folklore, genetic endowments, or traditional 
                                                          
 182. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs 
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INTL L.J. 357, 431 
(1998) (suggesting that panels rely on emergent state practice where there is concordant 
state practice in all four developmental categories). 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 13335. 
 184. Interestingly, in the Havana Club case, the Appellate Body was apparently 
willing to consider a somewhat subsequent development, namely the letter that WIPO 
wrote in response to the questions posed by the Panel. See supra text accompanying note 
78. 
 185. US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.70. 
 186. Id. ¶ 6.68. 
 187. The Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, which updates WIPOs 
Trademark Law Treaty, is another example of a relatively easy case. See Singapore 
Treaty on the Law of Trademarks art. 2, opened for signature Mar. 27, 2006, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 110-2 (2007). The treaty was the product of extensive working sessions by the 
WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Geographical Indications and 
Industrial Designs (SCT). Among other things, it settles the question whether three-
dimensional marks are protectable in Rule 3(b)(4), which was a longstanding issue under 
Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. See Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty on the 
Law of Trademarks, Rule 3(b)(4), opened for signature Mar. 27, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. No. 
110-2 (2007); see, e.g., Philips Elecs. BV v. Remington Consumer Prods., [1998] R.P.C. 
283, 29091 (1997) (Ch.) (U.K.).  
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knowledgeor agreements (such as the potential findings of the 
WIPO Development Agenda) that mandate a level of protection 
below that which TRIPS explicitly requires. 
Nonetheless, a strong case can be made for consulting many 
of these materials. Certainly, contemporaneity with TRIPS 
should not be dispositive. Indeed, the more distant from TRIPS, 
the more likely the measure will reflect members efforts to cope 
with new developments in TRIPS-consistent ways. If one 
understands the interpretive project as avoiding the obsolescence 
of the system of international intellectual property rather than 
an historical inquiry designed to divine what negotiators thought 
appropriate in 1994, this argument is even stronger.188 While 
many WIPO measures are not formal agreements, neither was 
the WCT at the time it was cited in US-110(5).189 Even when 
WIPO instruments are not destined to become formally binding, 
they represent the work of experts in the field and are open to 
input from state delegations. As such, they are somewhat akin to 
the internationally developed standards that other WTO 
framework agreements expressly take into account.190 These 
materials demonstrate how the terms in the TRIPS Agreement 
are construed in new contexts, and what interested parties see as 
appropriate ways to resolve novel issues.191 
Of course, not every document issued by WIPO is subject to 
the kind of vetting that produces a balanced instrument, and 
many are not the product of genuine consensus among the WIPO 
membership (let alone the WTO). These issues should, however, 
go to the weight these materials are given in the interpretive 
process.192 The nature of the measurebe it report, model laws, 
or resolutionshould be taken into account, along with such 
matters as the degree of transparency accorded to interested 
parties (including civil society); the diversity of the input; the 
extent to which state delegations participated; how states, 
commentators, and practitioners reacted to the instrument; and 
                                                          
 188. Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 16 (2008) (noting that the drafters of the U.S. Constitution used the words 
We the People rather than we the people of 1787). 
 189. See US-110(5), supra note 58, ¶ 6.68. Admittedly, the parties to the dispute had 
both ratified it, but the Vienna Convention is usually interpreted as requiring ratification 
by the parties to the agreement at issue, not the dispute. 
 190. See supra note 44 (discussing the various WTO agreements that reference pre-
existing standards). 
 191. See PAUWELYN, supra note 44, at 25760. 
 192. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An 
(Inter)Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 38691 
(2007) (suggesting similar considerations in weight to be given to international 
instruments in domestic constitutional analysis). 
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how many WIPO members formally adopted the conclusions (and 
under what circumstances193). Thus, as we saw, the US-110(5) 
Panel took account of the WCT, even though that agreement had 
yet to enter into force.194 Notably, the WCT was heavily debated 
in an exceedingly open process.195  
In contrast, the China-Enforcement Panel, when considering 
what counted as commercial scale for determining whether 
China had breached its enforcement obligations, consulted how 
that term was used by the WIPO Committee of Experts on 
Measures Against Counterfeiting and Piracy and the Draft Model 
Provisions for National Laws set out in a memorandum by the 
International Bureau of WIPO.196 However, the Panel ultimately 
decided not to use the explanatory material because there had 
been no agreement on them. According to the Panel, the 
materials should not be elevate[d] . . . to the status of the proper 
interpretation of a treaty text that was negotiated in another 
forum and that was finally agreed.197 The Panel did not specify 
what sort of agreement it was looking for. Were the WTO to 
consider the factors we have enumerated in determining how 
much deference to accord this material, there would be an 
interesting side benefit: WIPO negotiators would have a new 
incentive to make their deliberations more open and 
participatory. Interpretive canons of this sort thus not only allow 
for the updating of international norms, they can also alter the 
political and institutional economy in more structural ways.198 
The Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Well Known Marks, a 1999 document interpreting 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, furnishes an example of how 
this approach could work.199 TRIPS was concluded before the 
Internet revolutionized global marketing. Consequently, the 
negotiators did not grapple with the ramifications of e-commerce, 
including the extent to which it increases the likelihood of 
consumer confusion and leads to interference between domain 
                                                          
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 17982 (noting the extent to which states 
have been forced into TRIPS-plus measures through bilateral agreements). 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 13335. 
 195. See generally Samuelson, supra note 42 (tracing the WCT debate). 
 196. China-Enforcement, supra note 65, ¶ 7.562. 
 197. Id. ¶ 7.567.  
 198. Cf. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Dynamics, supra note 21, at 99103 (discussing how 
a more flexible approach to national implementation could affect the political structure of 
WTO member states); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 11 (discussing the role of emerging 
nations in developing intellectual property norms, operating under TRIPS flexibilities). 
 199. See WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc. 833(E) (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
export/sites/www/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf. 
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names and trademarks. These issues were, however, tackled by 
the Joint Resolution, which was adopted by the Assembly of the 
Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the 
General Assembly of WIPO, and was based on work by a 
committee of experts and the work of the Standing Committee on 
the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs, and Geographic 
Indications. The Resolution provides rules for determining when 
a mark is well known and when a mark has priority over similar 
domain names.200 Both of these issues had vexed the membership, 
and, in each case, most of the guidance (arguably) flows naturally 
from agreed norms on the role trademarks play in the 
marketplace. Should either the definition issue or the domain 
name question arise in dispute resolution, adjudicators ought to 
regard the Joint Resolution as highly informative of the meaning 
of Article 6bis. At the same time, however, the Joint Resolution 
also contains a provision protecting well-known marks from 
dilution.201 This protection, which is independent of consumer 
confusion, was hotly contested and several members refused to 
join in the recommendation.202 Accordingly, if the DSB were 
called upon to decide whether TRIPS requires dilution protection, 
adjudicators would have sufficient information to conclude that 
the Joint Resolution does not shed light on the issue.203 
Skepticism is also appropriate for WIPO measures that 
recommend protection for new kinds of subject matter, such as 
databases, traditional knowledge, or publicity rights. While 
national intellectual property laws tend to be interpreted 
capaciously in order to encourage revolutionary advances,204 the 
legitimacy of international instruments is strongly dependent on 
genuine agreement among the parties. There will be some close 
                                                          
 200. Id. arts. 2, 6. 
 201. Id. art. 4. 
 202. WIPO Director General, Memorandum on the Joint Resolution Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, ¶ 8, WIPO Doc. A/34/13 (Aug. 4, 1999), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_34/a_34_13.pdf. 
 203. Another example is the WIPO Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair 
Competition, WIPO Publication No. 832(E) (1996), which was based on a study by the 
Max Planck Institute, and expands upon the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention. Although such publications have been criticized as exceeding the scope of 
WIPOs authority, see Cornish, supra note 50, at 338, that critique could be taken into 
account in their utilization. See China-Enforcement, supra note 65, ¶ 7.567 (declining to 
use the Report of the WIPO Committee of Experts on Measures against Counterfeiting 
and Piracy of April 1988 to clarify the meaning of commercial scale because the experts 
never agreed on a particular meaning); see also id. ¶ 7.586 (considering the Model 
Provisions but acknowledging that the lack of consensus negates much of their impact). 
The McManis account of ACTA suggests that it too is an instrument that should not be 
taken into account in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. See McManis, supra note 161. 
 204. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 30809 (1980). 
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calls where the work of WIPO could be helpful in determining 
whether TRIPS covers the new subject matter; patent protection 
for software is an example.205 But new kinds of intellectual 
property are likely to require new minimum standards. Thus, 
even when there is substantial activity in WIPO, extending 
coverage to new fields is best done through formal revision of 
TRIPS rather than through more ad hoc actions, such as 
adjudication.206 
So far, most WIPO developments tend to be in the direction 
of interpreting agreements to maximize intellectual property 
holders rights. That could change with WIPOs new 
Development Agenda. If it does, then similar considerations 
should apply: in disputes over how TRIPS structures the balance 
between consumer and producer interests (or how much 
authority it leaves to member states), recommendations that are 
the product of expert views, that were subject to transparent 
procedures, are well-supported by members, and are clearly 
within the scope of WIPOs core expertise, ought to be consulted. 
Where there is evidence of disagreement or overreaching, or 
where the WIPO measure involves new types of rights, the 
WIPO instrument should not be used to construe the meaning 
of TRIPS and move international intellectual property forward 
too quickly. 
3. Other International Developments. Expanding the 
sources to which panels might refer is part of a larger effort to 
understand the international intellectual property system as a 
broad regime with a number of constituent parts.207 The 
international intellectual property system has always been 
highly textured. In the past, it required regard for national 
developments and a web of bilateral agreements.208 As previously 
noted, the current system is even more complicated, for many of 
the moving parts are now multinational in nature, compelling 
                                                          
 205. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 28497 (noting that the Agreement 
only specifically requires copyright protection for software). 
 206. This is not to say that national protection for new subject matter might not be 
subject to existing international obligations that are more structural in nature. For 
example, the protection extended to databases by the European Union in its Database 
Directive arguably could have been conceptualized as protection against unfair 
competition and subject to the national treatment provisions of the Paris Convention. See 
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying, supra note 21, at 44748 (discussing the different 
character of structural provisions); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 13845 (1997) (examining an unfair 
competition approach to protecting database content). 
 207. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 18. 
 208. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 103, ¶¶ 1.29.31.  
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attention to more varied international sources. Thus, much of 
what was said here applies equally to the efforts of other 
international organizations. For example, the WTO ought to 
regard the work of the World Health Organization as highly 
relevant to deciding when state actions improving access to 
medicines are compatible with TRIPS. It should take the actions 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity into account on issues 
regarding rights in agricultural knowledge. Because intellectual 
property often raises human rights issues, the work of the UN 
Millennium Project and the Commission on Human Rights would 
likewise interject important principles into TRIPS 
decisionmaking. Mainstreaming209 these values into TRIPS will 
not only provide a normative dimension currently missing from 
trade law, but it will also make the decisions of the WTO more 
acceptable to a broad array of constituents. This enriched 
perspective would help panels to engage in the normative 
analysis that they declare relevant to decisionmaking but seem 
unable (or unwilling) to undertake.210 And, to the extent that 
conformity with international norms should, as we believe, 
depend in part upon the relationship between a national law and 
its stated purpose, these sources should help panels to assess the 
policy justifications for different approaches. 
D. Devices for Ensuring Input 
Collectively, these arguments represent a call for deciding 
international intellectual property cases on the basis of a richer 
factual and normative record. How is this to be achieved within 
the WTO dispute settlement machinery? It appears that the 
Appellate Body approves of the practice, initiated by the Havana 
Club Panel, of asking the International Bureau of WIPO for 
relevant information on the negotiation history of particular 
agreements and subsequent developments.211 This practice 
apparently follows one that the TRIPS negotiators used 
themselves; indeed, the document that the TRIPS Negotiating 
Group asked the International Bureau of WIPO to prepare was 
itself used in the US-110(5) case.212 As we saw, WIPO does not 
have a seat at the table in the meetings of the TRIPS Council; 
asking it to provide its views during dispute resolution interjects 
                                                          
 209. See Howse, supra note 57, ¶ 5 (suggesting the mainstreaming of the general 
normativity of human rights into the making and administrating of global economic and 
social regulation and policy).  
 210. See, e.g., US-110(5), supra note 58; Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 38. 
 211. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 212. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
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a measure of intellectual property sensibilities into the WTO 
lawmaking process. 
It may, however, be possible to build on these practices in 
ways that are helpful in addressing a pervasive problemhow to 
maintain the currency of international intellectual property law. 
As we suggested above, consulting only sources about the Paris 
and Berne Conventions that existed at the end of the Uruguay 
Round does not provide a mechanism for adapting the TRIPS 
Agreement to new circumstances. One idea is to continue to ask 
for input from WIPOs International Bureau. However, these 
requests could be broadened to include not only factual 
information about pre-TRIPS practices,213 but also its opinions 
on implementation options and how to handle new problems. The 
technical assistance that WIPO is currently providing to TRIPS 
members gives it a window on the problems confronting 
developing countries and a unique position from which to devise 
TRIPS-consistent solutions. Pursuant to Article 67 of TRIPS, 
nations in the North are required to offer help to the countries of 
the South in implementing their laws;214 as previously noted, the 
WTO has an agreement with WIPO to assist in this process.215 
While there are continuing suspicions about the nature of the 
help thus offered (including claims that the North is using this 
duty to impose on emerging economies laws more appropriate for 
the developed than the developing world), both WIPO and the 
WTO have embarked on Development Agendas. If the 
organizations are true to the spirit of Article 67, the advice given 
should include information about the flexibilities in the 
Agreement and the steps these countries could take to promote 
their domestic interests. The practices resulting from this 
collaboration ought then to be regarded as strong evidence of the 
meaning of the TRIPS Agreement.216 More radically, perhaps, 
WIPO could provide advice directly to adjudicators, playing a role 
not unlike the Advocate-General in the European Court of 
Justice.217 
                                                          
 213. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 214. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 67. 
 215. WTO/WIPO Agreement, supra note 36. 
 216. See Howse, supra note 57; Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 4. 
 217. The use of devices such as Advocates-General might help to ameliorate the 
skewing of dispute panel jurisprudence depending upon the identity of the parties. See 
Dinwoodie, supra note 18, at 50810. Generous permission for third party involvement 
has arguably already helped address some of these concerns. The DSU currently provides 
developing countries with legal assistance from the WTO Secretariat. See DSU, supra 
note 16, art. 27.2. Developing countries have long sought to increase that assistance, 
through such devices as a Permanent Defense Counsel to assist developing countries in 
proceedings brought against them. See Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO 
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Either of these ideas would, of course, confer on WIPO 
broader authority than currently exists.218 And despite recent 
movements to embrace the Development Agenda, many groups 
remain skeptical of investing too much power in WIPO. But it 
might be possible to lift traditional restraints on the form of 
WIPO involvement if other institutional checks are put in place 
to ensure balance. If there are concerns about whether WIPO 
adequately represents the collective views of its members, then 
the WTO could predicate its willingness to solicit WIPOs opinion 
on the transparency of WIPOs deliberative process.219 
There is also an obverse concern: the WTO could perceive 
the requirement to seek information from other sources as a 
diminution in its power. To preserve its authority, the WTO 
could resist using this information to inject non-trade-based 
considerations into its decisionmaking. In national contexts, such 
problems are avoided through a variety of devices that exert 
control over agencies.220 But because there is no source of such 
control in the international setting, the WTO could, in theory, 
decide to ignore input from other sources. Nonetheless, we 
believe that a practice of considering other sources could 
institutionalize over time. Use of outside materials in no way 
changes the WTOs authority; these materials merely aid in its 
decisionmaking. For example, the Objectives and Principles in 
the TRIPS Agreement are very general, as are the concepts of 
normal exploitation and legitimate interest.221 The absence of 
judicially manageable standards222 may be one reason that 
panels are reluctant to rely on the former or to give meaning to 
the latter.223 To the extent that other materials supply context 
                                                          
Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14 AM. U. 
INTL L. REV. 1223, 123032 (1999) (listing a range of proposals to augment assistance to 
developing countries, funded by WTO budget surpluses). 
 218. See supra note 203 (illustrating the limitations on the scope of WIPOs 
authority). 
 219. As noted in the Introduction, there are structural reasons to believe that WIPO 
is representative of its members. See supra text accompanying notes 3238; see also 
Memorandum of the Director-General, supra note 202, ¶ 13 (describing informal 
consultations with WIPO regional groups used to develop the recommendation). 
 220. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 126364, 1267 (2006); Harold H. Bruff & 
Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of 
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1373, 137576 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 45480 (1987). 
 221. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 78 (objectives and principles); see, e.g., id. art. 
13 (using the terms normal exploitation and legitimate interest but not defining 
them). 
 222. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962). 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 141. 
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and content, adjudicators may become quite receptive to their 
use. And such use tends only to legitimize politically the 
decisions of the adjudicators, a concern that is manifested in 
many ways by the reports that have been handed down to date. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Much ink has been spilled on how to interpret WTO 
agreements.224 However, as we and others have noted, TRIPS 
presents many special problems. Trade law is largely negative in 
nature (it sets limits on what countries can do). It is highly 
technical in effect and aims at producing a resultlowering 
trade barriersthat is regarded as an unmitigated benefit from a 
global perspective. In contrast, TRIPS imposes positive rights (it 
requires states to enact new law). Because these rights touch on 
critical spheres, such as health, safety, culture, and political life, 
the thrust of TRIPSmaximizing protectionis not always the 
optimal result. Indeed, the optimal result is difficult to 
determine: as nations become more developed, their intellectual 
property needs change; cultural shifts produce different attitudes 
toward exclusive rights, and the innovations that intellectual 
property law encourages alter the terms on which innovation 
occurs. To make matters even worse, TRIPS does not include 
robust protection for national interests. The general exceptions 
clause that safeguards the impact of other parts of the WTO 
agreements on the welfare of member states does not appear to 
apply to TRIPS, and multiple panel decisions have eroded the 
value of the flexibilities that TRIPS expressly mentions.225 
WIPO (and, by extension, the work of other international 
organizations) holds considerable potential for helping the WTO 
mitigate these concerns. WIPO has long experience in 
                                                          
 224. See, e.g., PAUWELYN, supra note 44 (exploring the interpretation of WTO law 
with considerations of other rules of international law); Christopher Arup, The State of 
Play of Dispute Settlement Law at the World Trade Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 
897 (2003) (discussing interpretative approaches of the WTO in dispute settlements); 
Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INTL 
ECON. L. 17 (2002) (exploring the WTO Panel and Appellate Bodys approaches to treaty 
interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial 
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. 
INTL L. 247 (2004) (noting the varying degrees of deference that may be given in the 
interpretation of WTO agreements); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 
EUR. J. INTL L. 623 (2006) (exploring the constitutional functions of the WTO). 
 225. GATT, supra note 45, art. XX (general exceptions clause); see Dinwoodie & 
Dreyfuss, Dynamics, supra note 21, at 10103 (noting the TRIPS exceptions are narrowly 
circumscribed); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 39, at 4546 (comparing 
interpretations of TRIPS Article 8 and GATT Article XX); see also PAUWELYN, supra note 
44, at 15961. 
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intellectual property matters and in accommodating the various 
interests of the creative community and those who consume its 
products. By relying on WIPOs instruments and expertise, the 
WTO could incorporate intellectual property values into its 
lawmaking process. We are aware that some readers will find it 
odd that we recommend relying on WIPO as a source for a more 
balanced approach to intellectual property protection; some will 
think it easier to amend TRIPS (for example by adding user 
rights226) than to put faith in an organization whose primary goal 
is not to balance interests, but rather to promote intellectual 
property protection.227 While we share these concerns, we believe 
that WIPO brings to the table an intellectual property sensibility 
that the WTO currently lacks. WIPOs Development Agenda also 
suggests that its approach to intellectual property rights is 
changing in a manner conducive to a more sophisticated analysis 
of the role intellectual property plays in the economy. Besides, 
with so many organizations working on issues that relate to 
intellectual property, the time has come to conceptualize their 
interaction. There is no better place to begin than with the 
relationship between WIPO and the WTO. 
 
                                                          
 226. See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, OPEN SOCY INST., CONCEIVING 
AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 1125 
(2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/limitations_exceptions_ 
copyright.pdf; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: 
New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 98 AM. SOCY INTL L. PROC. 213, 219 (2004); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
21, 30, 3233 (2004); Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough Is Enough
The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection 4144, 
6467 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper 
Series No. 09-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1326429 (proposing an 
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement that replaces the three-step test with a provision 
that better identifies and weighs the relevant factors). 
 227. Ruth Okediji, in particular, has made a strong case for giving a hierarchically 
superior role to the WTO, based on the theory that it is too late for WIPO to successfully 
divest itself of its own institutional culture as a promoter of strong intellectual property 
rights. Okediji, supra note 47, at 910. 
